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TRADITIONAL AND MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES:
THREE ESSAYS EXAMINING THEIR RISK BEHAVIOR,
DELISTING BEHAVIOR, AND REACTIONS TO
ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY
Marc S. Schaffer, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University 2012
In the wake of our country’s greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, the need to
better understand the risks and behaviors associated with financial intermediaries has become
apparent. In particular, the literature distinguishes between traditional or depository-based financial
intermediaries and their market-based or non-depository counterparts. This dissertation focuses on
understanding the behavioral differences across these two groups by examining their equity-based
risk differences, their stock market delisting differences, and lastly how these firms react to economic
policy uncertainty.
The first essay uses an equity-based approach to quantify the average firm-level risk that is
associated with these intermediary groups. While these intermediaries, at times, demonstrate similar
risk behaviors, the market-based financial intermediaries display a distinct ten-year period of greater
risk beginning in 1994. Since the 1980’s there has been a trend of increasing financial market
instability that is commonly attributed to increasing competition, securitization, and deregulation.
Using a historical decomposition approach, I analyze which of these factors best explains the
changing relative risk behaviors across the traditional and market-based intermediaries. The most
important factor in driving these behaviors was deregulation, with competition also having a
significant impact.
The second essay examines the stock market survival behavior of each of these respective
groups and the role that risk plays in explaining delisting due to firm failure, as well as merger and

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
acquisition activity. Using survival analysis, the delisting behavior of these intermediaries is examined
where the market-based firms are more likely to delist relative to the traditional firms due to both
firm failure and M&A activity.

Additionally, idiosyncratic risk is found to have a statistically

significant impact in driving these behaviors.
The last essay focuses on how each of these intermediary groups alters their balance sheet in
the face of economic uncertainty. Specifically, I examine how the debt-financing behavior of these
firms reacts to an economic policy uncertainty shock using a macroeconomic approach. The key
results, from the impulse response and variance decomposition analysis, indicate that market-based
financial intermediaries tend to have faster responses to policy uncertainty relative to traditional
intermediaries, however the small traditional financial intermediaries have the largest response.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past hundred years, the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933 remains as the most
catastrophic economic event in U.S. history. According the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(2012), the U.S. experienced nearly a thirty percent drop in GDP, a thirty percent fall in the
Consumer Price Index, and a national unemployment rate that peaked at twenty-five percent. While
the 2007Q4-2009Q2 recession is one of the greatest economic crises since the Great Depression,
with a five percent fall in GDP and an unemployment rate reaching ten percent at its highest point in
October 2009 (FRED 2012), a quick comparison of these key economic indicators appears to
marginalize the true impact of the recent financial crisis. In fact, one of the most notable and
impactful economic realizations that occurred as a result of this crisis, aside from the magnitude of its
effect, lies in understanding why it happened.
In May 2009, the United States Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act,
which included the establishment of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC).

This

commission was tasked with objective of determining the causes of the financial and economic crisis.
After nearly two years of research, interviews, and testimony, the Commission determined several
main drivers or causes of this noteworthy financial crisis, with various economic agents sharing the
responsibility.
First and foremost, the FCIC (2011) found the government’s lack of oversight and
deregulation responsible for setting the stage for the disastrous financial market behavior. This
environment allowed for key financial institutions to practice poor corporate governance and risk
management behavior, which led them to pursue excessive borrowing and risky investment
strategies. Additionally, the government and Federal Reserve were poorly prepared for the crisis and
the inconsistency of their responses added to the uncertainty of these markets. The FCIC (2011) also
concluded that the government and corporate hierarchy created a system that lacked accountability
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on the part of regulators, executives, traders, etc., and bred an environment of questionable ethical
behavior, all of which helped to exacerbate the crisis. Lastly, financial innovation in the form of overthe-counter derivative products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default
swaps (CDSs), combined with weakening mortgage lending standards and securitization, served as
the catalyst responsible for kicking off this financial crisis.
While the FCIC (2011) concluded these eight drivers were responsible for causing the crisis,
the underlying theme across each of these factors was a connection to the financial intermediary
sector of the economy. The purpose of financial intermediaries is to provide the efficient allocation
of capital from savers to borrowers, and the subsequent consequence of this behavior is to spur
economic growth.
Historically, a traditional financial intermediary takes the form a typical bank or a depositorybased institution that uses customer deposits as a source of funding for investment purposes.
However, by the 1980’s a new type of firm emerged on the financial scene, market-based financial
intermediaries. These firms provide the same credit intermediation function to the economy as the
traditional intermediaries, but they rely exclusively on market-based sources of credit to fund their
investment activity. Simply stated, traditional intermediaries consist of typical commercial banks,
while investment banks, security broker dealers and asset-backed security issuers constitute the
market-based financial intermediary sector. At the core of the financial crisis lies the growth and
emergence of these two types of these intermediaries and how their investment and risk behaviors
impacted the U.S. economy.
According to the FCIC (2011), the financial sector has been the fastest growing sector of
the economy since the early 1980’s, making up roughly eight percent of U.S. GDP by the beginning
of the 21st century. While the growth of this sector coincides with the substantial asset growth of
several large financial intermediaries, such as J.P. Morgan who grew from $667 billion to $2.2 trillion
in assets over the eight-year span from 1999-2007, or Goldman Sachs who experienced an asset
change from $250 billion to $1.1 trillion over the same period, much of this growth was funded by
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leverage. Specifically the FCIC (2011) report states that financial companies borrowed only $13 from
credit markets for every $100 borrowed by nonfinancial firms in 1978, a number which grew to $51
for every $100 by 2007. However, the substantial balance sheet growth of these financial firms can
be attributed to the borrowing and lending that occurred within the financial intermediation sector,
as banks and broker dealers where simply lending to each other. In the words of former Treasury
Secretary John Snow in his October 7, 2010 interview with the FCIC (2011), “We have a lot more
debt than we used to have, which means we have a bigger financial sector…I think we overdid
finance versus the real economy.”
Given the importance of the financial intermediation sector and the role it has played in the
economy over the past three decades, this dissertation examines a series of behavioral differences
across the two key types of intermediaries, the traditional and market-based firms. Specifically, I
examine three key differences across these intermediary groups: their risk behavior, their stock
market delisting behavior, and their debt-financing reactions to economic policy uncertainty.
The first essay, “The Impact of Competition, Financial Innovation, and Regulation on the
Risk Behavior of Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries,” focuses on quantifying the
relative risk behavior of each financial intermediary group and explaining the role that financial
market regulation, increasing competition, securitization played in driving this behavior. Given that
previous literature has indicated greater pro-cyclical asset to leverage growth volatility for the marketbased financial intermediaries relative to the traditional firms, I test the hypothesis that market-based
financial intermediaries are indeed riskier than their traditional counterparts.
Using an equity-based risk measure in the form of Campbell et. al. (2001) and data from the
Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP), I quantify the changing nature of risk, at both the
industry and firm levels, across these two groups of intermediaries from the early 1980’s through the
financial crisis.

When looking at the volatility of these industries as a whole, the volatility is

statistically similar across both intermediary groups. However, examining the average firm-level
volatility across the market-based and traditional firms tells a slightly different story. For the average
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firm-level volatility, the beginning and end of the sample period indicate that the market-based and
traditional financial intermediaries exhibit statistically similar risk behaviors, but for the ten-year
period beginning in 1994, the market-based firms are found to carry significantly higher levels of
idiosyncratic or firm specific risk.
After proving that the market-based firms are indeed riskier, I examine which of the three
major causes of financial market instability, deregulation, increasing competition, and financial
market securitization, best explain the changes in the relative risk behavior of these two
intermediaries over time. Using a vector autoregressive framework combined with a historical
decomposition approach, I find that deregulation, by far, played the biggest role in explaining the
diverging and converging nature of risk across these two types of intermediaries. Additionally, the
changes in competition had a bigger statistically significant impact on the relative risk behavior than
the changes in financial market securitization.
Having established the greater risk behavior on behalf of the market-based firms, the second
essay, “The Market Survival of Publicly-Traded Traditional and Market-Based Financial
Intermediaries,” examines a consequence of this risk behavior: the stock market survival of these
respective firms. In particular, given that market-based firms display greater balance sheet volatility,
as well as greater equity-based risk, I hypothesize that the market-based firms will display lower stock
market survival rates than the traditional firms, as well as greater cumulative incidences of causespecific delisting in the form of firm failure and firm merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. I also
examine the role that idiosyncratic risk plays in driving these behaviors.
Utilizing a sample of nearly nine hundred publicly-traded financial intermediaries that listed
on the stock exchange between 1980-2009 and data from both CRSP and Compustat, I test the
validity of the above hypothesis using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, Cumulative Incidence functions,
and the Cox Proportional Hazards model from survival analysis. This three-prong approach allows
for the examination of the general delisting behavior across the intermediaries, the cause-specific
delisting behavior across intermediaries due to firm failure and M&A activity, and the identification
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of the factors that impact the aforementioned delisting behavior.
In terms of general delisting behavior, I find that the market-based financial intermediaries
have lower stock market survival rates than their traditional financial intermediary counterparts. As a
matter of perspective, a market-based financial intermediary only has a twenty-five percent chance of
remaining on the stock exchange twelve years (fourty-eight quarters) after listing, while a traditional
financial intermediary stands roughly a forty-two percent chance of survival over the same time
frame. To further understand this delisting behavior, I also examine the delisting due to firm failure,
as well as, delisting due to M&A activity.

Under both causes, the market-based financial

intermediaries were more likely to delist, however, the differences across groups were far more
substantial for firm failure relative to M&A activity.
The hypothesis of greater delisting behavior for market-based firms is predicated on the
basis of greater risk-taking behavior of these firms, as such the Cox Proportional Hazards model
examines if idiosyncratic risk plays a role in explaining the delisting behavior of the intermediaries.
Idiosyncratic risk is found to play a positive and statistically significant role in explaining firm failure,
and in some instances M&A activity, suggesting that the idiosyncratic risk behavior is a driving factor
of the delisting behavior.
The third and final essay, “Reacting to Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks: The Timing
and Responsiveness of Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries’ Debt-Financing
Behavior,” extends the risk behavior findings to examine another consequence of these results across
the traditional and market-based financial intermediaries, the firms’ debt-financing reactions to
economic policy uncertainty. Previous literature by Arian and Shin (2011) has indicated that financial
intermediaries, both commercial banks and investment banks, tend to exhibit “sticky” equity, where
the equity component on their balance sheets changes at a constant growth rate. This finding
suggests that the liability or debt-financing behavior of these firms is vital to their balance sheet
fluctuations and ultimately their asset growth. Given the importance of this component in explaining
the balance sheet behavior of these firms, the third essay examines the responses of the debt-
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financing behavior of the market-based and traditional firms to a shock in economic policy
uncertainty. Specifically, I examine both the timing and response, in terms of magnitude, of the
debt-financing component to economic policy uncertainty, testing the hypothesis that the traditional
firms will have a smaller and slower response than the market-based intermediaries.
This claim is tested from a macroeconomic approach, using aggregate Federal Reserve Flow
of Funds (2012) data, where the balance sheet information for both small and large commercial
banks is used to capture the traditional financial intermediary behavior, and the security broker dealer
and asset-backed security issuer balance sheet data is used for the market-based financial
intermediaries. Since the goal of the analysis it to assess the general firm reactions to economic
policy uncertainty, in order to avoid specific arguments for different types of uncertainty, economic
policy uncertainty is measured using the recently created index by Baker et al (2012). This index
consists of three key components: uncertainty related to news and media coverage, tax policy, and
forecaster disagreements from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Using this broad measure of uncertainty, a vector error correction (VEC) model is
analyzed containing the non-core liability growth of the traditional firms and the total liability growth
of the market-based firms. I use impulse response function (IRF) and variance decomposition
(VDC) analysis in order to assess the timing and response of this debt-financing behavior for
comparison.
The overall findings of this analysis suggest mixed results pertaining to the validity of the
timing and size of the reactions across these intermediaries. With regard to the first part of the
hypothesis, traditional financial intermediaries, in the form of small commercial banks, actually
exhibit a larger debt-financing response to economic policy uncertainty than the large commercial
banks and either market-based intermediary. Given the reliance of the policy uncertainty index on a
news and media-based uncertainty coverage, this result may be driven by the lacking analytical
resources of these small commercial bank institutions and their reliance on the news and media as an
important factor in their decision making process. The second hypothesis is validated in this analysis,
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where market-based financial intermediaries respond to an economic policy uncertainty shock faster
than their traditional financial intermediary counterparts. Specifically, total liabilities of ABS issuers
respond immediately to a shock in policy uncertainty, while it takes the non-core liabilities of small
commercial banks three quarters to respond, and the total liabilities of the security broker dealers five
quarters to respond.
On the whole, this dissertation extends the current literature regarding the differences
between traditional and market-based financial intermediaries to examine three distinct behavior
differences. These behavioral differences also contribute to several important policy implications
regarding the regulatory environments and government bailout opportunities that exist for each of
these firms, which is discussed in my concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION, FINANCIAL INNOVATION, AND
REGULATION ON THE RISK BEHAVIOR OF TRADITIONAL AND MARKETBASED FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
2.1. Introduction
Over the past three decades, the structure and composition of financial intermediation has changed
drastically due to changes in competition, financial innovation, and the regulatory framework. A byproduct of these changes has been the growth and emergence of market-based financial
intermediaries relative to the traditional deposit-based financial intermediaries. While traditional
intermediaries (i.e. commercial banks) function as depository institutions, using their customer
deposits for a large portion of investment funds, the market-based intermediaries (i.e. investment
banks or asset-backed security issuers) rely heavily on market-based borrowing channels such as
commercial paper or repos as sources of capital. The market-based institutions and their investment
practices played a pivotal role in the development of the housing bubble and ultimately the most
recent financial crisis. A key lesson of the crisis, as noted by Adrian and Shin (2011), is the
realization that the risk behavior of the financial intermediary sector can have direct and potentially
severe impacts on economic activity. In this spirit, the primary purpose of this paper is to examine
the evolution of the risk behaviors of the traditional and market-based intermediaries from a
macroeconomic perspective and determine which of the three key financial sector catalysts,
competition, financial innovation, and regulatory changes, best explain these behaviors.
Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2011) analyze the behavioral differences of these two types of
intermediaries from a balance sheet perspective through their leverage ratios. Their research indicates
that the market-based intermediaries display a stronger procyclical asset to leverage growth
relationship, suggesting greater balance sheet volatility relative to the traditional depository
institutions. During asset booms, the market-based firms take on more leverage relative to the
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traditional firms, while they de-lever their portfolios more during asset bust periods. This balance
sheet behavior can easily translate into greater firm-specific risk according to Shumway (2001), as the
idiosyncratic risk, from an equity market volatility approach, can serve as a proxy for the variability of
a firm’s cashflows. Since the broker dealers and shadow banks display more variability with respect
to their balance sheet behavior, I hypothesize that more idiosyncratic risk should be associated with
these firms relative to the traditional financial intermediaries.
I examine this hypothesis using an equity-based measure of risk derived from the Campbell
et al. (2001) (CLMX) model approach. This method of risk calculation separates the total return
volatility of a particular security into three elements: the component of the volatility due to the
market, due to the industry, and due to the firm. Using CRSP data, I construct the industry volatility
and the average firm-level volatility associated with traditional and market-based financial
intermediaries over the monthly 1980-2010 period. While the two intermediary sectors display
similar firm-level risk behaviors from 1980 through the early 90’s and from about 2004 to the
present, the ten-year period beginning around 1994 shows the market-based firms displaying
significantly riskier behaviors relative to their counterparts. Thus, the market-based firms did indeed
exhibit greater risk taking practices in the middle of this sample.
Using the derived risk measures, I examine which of the following financial market drivers
of competition, financial innovation, and regulatory changes, best explain the diverging and
converging risk behaviors of these two groups of financial intermediaries over this period. Using a
vector autoregressive (VAR) model and a historical decomposition approach, I analyze the impact of
each of these factors on forecasting the ratio of the market-based and traditional intermediaries risk
behavior. During the decade of the 1990’s, while market-based financial intermediaries experienced
increasing relative risk, the regulatory changes hold the most explanatory power of these three factors
for this behavior, while changes in competition had greater impacts relative to securitization.
Following the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, which sparked financial consolidation across
firms, the changing nature of competition due to regulation was the driving factor in the early years
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following the millennium. The key contribution of this analysis highlights the evolutionary changes
in the risk behaviors of market-based and traditional financial intermediaries and the factors driving
both their diverging and converging nature over time.

2.2. Motivating the Risk Differences Between Market-Based and Traditional Financial
Intermediaries
Prior to examining the changing risk behaviors of traditional vs. market-based intermediaries over
time, it is important to understand the changes in the financial sector landscape that have shaped this
market segment. Following the Great Depression, a series of laws were enacted for the purpose of
providing stability to the financial system, the Banking Act of 1933 or the Glass-Steagall Act, was the
defining piece of legislation. According to Acharya et al. (2009), the two key components of the Act
included the establishment the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the restrictions
placed on the risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions. The creation of the FDIC was born out
of the need to minimize the risk of bank runs, which proved to be very effective, as federal backing
for deposits provided the necessary security to put bank customers at ease. The second component
regulated the investment and funding activities of commercial banks relative to other financial
institutions, limiting them to function as depository institutions and issuers of consumer and
commercial loans. The remaining “riskier” financial market activities, such as underwriting corporate
debt and equity issuance, etc., were left to other institutions outside of the commercial banking
sector. Following this regulation and several other minor securities related acts throughout the
remainder of that decade, set the ground work for a relatively stable financial system for nearly 50
years, as noted by Acharya et al. (2009).
However, since the early 1980’s, the U.S. financial system has seen a series of domestic
shocks, such as the S&L crisis of the 1980’s, the stock market crash of 1987, the Long-Term Capital
Management and Dot-Com market crises of the late 90’s, and of course the most recent financial
crisis driven by the bursting of the housing bubble. This begs the obvious question, what changed in
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the financial sector to bring about instability over the past 30 years?

The literature explaining this

phenomenon such as Frame and White (2009), Lown et al. (2000), and Carey and Stulz (2005) can
generally be broken up into four categories: changes in technology and financial innovation, increases
in competition and firm specialization, changes and reactions to regulatory frameworks and the
emergence of the market-based intermediary sector. However, according to Pozsar (2008), “the
traditional model of banking—borrow short, lend long, and hold on to loans as an investment—has
been fundamentally reshaped by competition, regulation and innovation.” This statement suggests
that these three factors can be linked to the growth of the market-based intermediary sector. Thus, I
will focus on those three primary causes of market instability and analyze their impact on the risk
differences between traditional and market-based financial intermediaries to determine which of the
factors best explain their deviations.

2.2.1. Technology Changes and Financial Innovation
There have been significant technological and financial innovations over the past several decades that
have played an important role in the industry. Kroszner (2000), and Kroszner and Strahan (2007)
suggest that simple technology enhancements such as automated teller machines (ATMs), new cash
access vehicles such as money market funds, and alternative forms of communication, such as the
online and telephone banking, all weakened the bank-customer relationships, reducing the role of
traditional banks. Couple that with the online brokerage accounts and greater access to investment
opportunities, the nature of traditional banking has been fundamentally reshaped by technology.
Aside from the technology changes, financial innovation is another main driver of the
changing nature of the financial sector, specifically as it relates to securitization and new risk
management techniques, such as credit default swaps (CDS). Over the course of the 90’s and 2000’s,
new financial products in the form of securitized loans and CDSs became commonplace. Financial
institutions began packaging pools of loans, in the form of mortgage loans, auto loans, student loans,
and even credit card debt, and selling them as securities such as asset-backed securities (ABS) or
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mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Poszar et al. (2010) indicates the purpose of this process was
three-fold: first the institutions issuing the loans were able to off-load the risk of holding these loans
while collecting various origination and servicing fees, second, the institutions responsible for
packaging the ABSs or MBSs were able to generate income from product creation and maintenance,
and lastly, the end investor was able to access a “seemingly” diversified pool of loans that would
generate steady cashflows. As an extension to these products, pools of MBSs were then constructed
as collateralized debt obligations, which again provided for greater diversification and allowed for
higher ratings and more investment opportunities. The unintended consequence of these products
was the lengthened liquidity transformation chain from the borrower through the end investor,
which added several layers of potential risk according to Pozsar et al. (2010). Additionally, the CDS
market grew significantly over this period, where CDSs are simply a form of insurance, which
allowed firms to offset some of their portfolio risk and provided new risk management techniques.
One approach to visualizing the changes in financial innovation over time is to examine
which types of financial intermediaries are in possession of home mortgages. Figure 2.1 uses Federal
Reserve Flow of Funds data to display the total amount of home mortgages held by the respective
firm groups, which evidences a clear shifting trend across the intermediaries.1 In this figure, the bankbased category is comprised of the total amount of home mortgages held by commercial banks,
savings institutions, and credit unions. The market-based category is constructed based on the
remainder of home mortgage holders, which is dominated by agency or GSE mortgage pools (and
their subsequent holders), private label mortgage pools (ABS issuers), and the GSEs themselves.
This figure highlights the growing role that the market-based institutions have played in the
securitization of certain assets over the past decade relative to the traditional financial intermediaries.
Ultimately, both the technology changes and financial innovations helped to alter the nature of the
traditional banking system and subsequently impacted the risk behaviors of firms in the financial
industry.
1
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Figure 2.1 Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries' Home Mortgage Holders
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2.2.2. Competition and Firm Specialization
The second factor that drove the changes in the financial system relates to increasing competition
and firm specialization. Keeley (1990), Cordell et al. (1993) argue that one of the root causes of the
S&L crisis was the increase in competition that eliminated the monopolistic power once held by the
banks and thrifts in geographic regions. Campbell et al. (2001) discuss the trend of “breaking-up” of
large conglomerates in the 80’s and early 90’s into individual companies, each of which would carry
greater levels of idiosyncratic risk relative to the combined entity. The growth of financial innovation
also brought new opportunities for specialized firms in the securitization markets. Given the reliance
of these firms on niche markets segments and limited balance sheet diversification, greater
idiosyncratic risk was added to the sector.
Following the Financial Modernization Act in 1999, however, there was a shift toward
financial market consolidation with intermediaries, both market-based and traditional, experienced a
great deal of M&A activity. Given the diversification of product offerings that large firms now
possessed following consolidation, the idiosyncratic risk was reduced in the financial sector beginning
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in 2003 and replaced with financial sector risk according to Houston and Stiroh (2006). While the
period between 1980-2011 experienced increasing competition and firm specialization, followed by
market concentration, all of these behaviors contributed to the “new” financial sector structure.

2.2.3. Financial Regulation
The final component driving the changes in the financial industry pertains to regulation, both in
terms of firm reactions to regulations, and changes in the laws themselves. With the new technology
and innovations, the regulatory framework originally outlined by the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933
became outdated resulting in new interpretations of the laws and eventually deregulation. Acharya et
al. (2009), Lown et al. (2002), and Wilmarth (2002) outline the legal environment over the past three
decades including the reinterpretation of section 20 (the Fed allowed banks to generate 5% of
revenues later 10%, then 25% from investment banking activities) and ultimately the Gramm-LeachBliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. The last act was the formal repeal of GlassSteagall, and lifted the restrictions regarding the merging of banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies while eliminating financial activity restrictions. The era of deregulation was further
expanded by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act the following year and relaxing of the netcapital rule of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in August 2004 that allowed firms to extend their
leverage behaviors.

The overall trend of these regulatory changes was a movement toward

deregulation of the financial industry, which led to consolidation and allowed for greater-risk taking
behaviors of firms in a “too-big-to-fail” environment.

2.2.4. The Rise of Market-Based Financial Intermediaries
While the changes in competition, innovation, and regulation can be cited as drivers of financial
market instability, they can be directly linked to the growth and emergence of the shadow-banking
sector according to Poszar (2008). The regulations in place that limited the investment banking
activities of traditional banks, led to the growth of the market-based financial intermediary sector.
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This segment of the industry finances its investment behavior largely from market-based sources of
income, such as commercial paper markets or repurchase agreements (repos) and does not rely on
deposits as a source of investment funding, yet they still serve as a source of credit intermediation.
With the rise of financial innovations in the form of securitization, the market-based firms
were able to play a vital role in growth of these markets in the early 90’s, at time when the
commercial banks were regulatory constrained.

This period also brought opportunities for

specialized firms to enter these markets. For example, Collegiate Funding Services (CFS) provides
financial planning services to college students and offers private student loans (NASDAQ 2004).
CFS funds some of this behavior by issuing asset-backed notes (backed by the student loans). After
issuing these loans, they off-load some of their risk by packaging them as asset-backed securities and
selling them in the market while still servicing these loans. The specialization of these firms, dealing
with a limited number of funding sources and a single service makes the company riskier than a large
diversified financial institution, such as J.P. Morgan Chase,2 for example. Additionally the regulatory
framework helped drive the growth of the market-based intermediary sector in the early 80’s and
90’s, but later led to the consolidation of both the market-based and traditional intermediaries.
Given the three major causes of financial market instability that also enabled the growth of
the market-based intermediaries over the past decades, this paper seeks to examine the changing risk
behaviors of the traditional and market-based firms over this sample period, and determine which of
these causes can most explain the changing risk behaviors across these firms. Prior to the empirical
section, it is important to highlight the differing balance sheet behaviors across these firms, which
provides the motivation for examining their varying risk behaviors over time.

In fact, according to a J.P. Morgan (2005) press release, this large financial institution actually purchased Collegiate
Funding Services, making it one its subsidiaries in December 2005, hence the financial market consolidation.
2
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2.2.5. Connecting the Balance Sheet Behaviors of Market-based and Traditional Financial
Intermediaries with Idiosyncratic Risk
Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2010c, 2011) have examined the balance sheet behavior of market-based and
traditional financial intermediaries and their role in the financial markets, the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, and as predictors of national output. Specifically, Adrian and Shin (2010a,
2011) indicate that both market-based intermediaries and traditional intermediaries display evidence
of a pro-cyclical leverage and asset growth relationship, while the market-based intermediaries display
greater levels of asset growth and leverage growth volatility relative to the traditional intermediaries.
The traditional intermediaries or commercial banks also tend to function as a safe haven for
borrowers during financial market downturns when the market-based intermediaries reduce the size
of their balance sheets.

The greater leverage fluctuations can be linked to greater levels of

idiosyncratic risk for these firms.
Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner
(1965), a typical security is subject to two specific types of risk: systematic and idiosyncratic.
Systematic risk is synonymous with market risk or risk that cannot be diversified away, while
idiosyncratic risk or firm-specific risk refers to risk associated with a particular security that can be
diversified away. Shumway (2001) includes idiosyncratic risk in a model of bank failure prediction
under the premise that it proxies for the variability of a firm’s cashflows whereby greater risk implies
greater likelihood of firm failure. Similarly, Irvine and Pontiff (2009) highlight the trend of increasing
idiosyncratic risk of the past decades and find that increasing competition and the variability of
balance sheet cashflow measures can adequately explain this phenomenon. One advantage of using
the idiosyncratic risk measure relative to pure balance sheet risk measures, is its ability to control for
the systematic risk or market risk impacting all firms, allowing for a more precise measure of firmspecific risk. Additionally, Brown and Kapadia (2007) note that the increasing levels of idiosyncratic
risk across the market can be linked to riskier, more volatile firms issuing public equity.
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If the balance sheet behavior displayed in the previous section is linked with the mentioned
idiosyncratic risk literature, a foundation is laid to postulate that market-based intermediaries will
carry higher levels of firm-specific risk relative to traditional financial intermediaries. Given that
market-based intermediaries display greater balance sheet volatility, these behaviors, driven by
competition, financial innovation, and regulation, should translate into greater firm-specific risk
associated with these types of institutions.

2.3. The Evolution of Financial Intermediary Risk: Data, Methodology, and Analysis
2.3.1. Data Overview
This research focuses on assessing the risk behavior of two narrow groups of publicly traded firms
using an equity-based measure of risk. The equity-based data is obtained via the Center for Research
and Security Prices (CRSP) Stock Price database. Adrian and Shin (2010a) indicate that market-based
intermediaries gained a market presence in the early to mid-eighties and gradually obtained market
share of assets over the following decades. The sample period selected for this study roughly
coincides with this period and contains monthly data from 1980:1 through 2010:12.
The study uses daily return data for all publicly traded securities and divides the securities
into industry sectors using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code classification following
Fama & French (1997) and Campbell et al. (2001). However, I utilize a slightly different definition
for the financial sector to align with the definitions of market-based and traditional intermediaries,
similar to Acharya et al. (2010). The Office of Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA
2011) has categorized firms in finance, insurance, and real estate as the division of SIC codes within
the 6000 range. This overall category has been further broken down by OSHA (2011) into subsets
by firm type including: Depository Institutions, Non-depository Credit Institutions, Security and
Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services, Insurance Carriers, Insurance Agents,
Brokers, and Services, Real Estate, and Holding and other Investment Offices.
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Adrian and Shin (2010c) define traditional depository-based intermediaries as commercial
banks and the market-based intermediaries as security broker dealers and shadow banks.

The

shadow banking sector, according to Adrian and Shin (2010c), includes asset-backed security (ABS)
issuers, finance companies, and funding companies according the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds
guide (Federal Reserve Governors 2011). Following their defined market segments, I aligned those
specifications as closely as possible with the SIC codes to create the samples of financial intermediary
groups.3
The sample of traditional financial intermediaries is comprised of those publicly traded firms
within the Depository Institutions category (i.e. within the SIC code range of 6000-6099). The
market-based intermediaries sample is constructed based on a combination of several different
categories including the Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, and Exchanges classification
(codes 6200-6299) and the Non-depository Credit Institutions (codes 6100-6199). The former group
obviously captures the security broker dealers. The shadow bank segment is comprised of the nondepository institutions such as credit institutions and mortgage brokers, both of which can proxy for
ABS issuers. Lastly, I include two more classifications in the market-based intermediaries’ sample:
Offices of Bank Holding Companies4 (SIC code 6712) and Offices of Holding Companies, Not
Elsewhere Classified (SIC code 6719).5 These two categories are included to mirror the finance and
funding company components of Adrian and Shin’s (2010) specification. Ultimately, the complete
sample is comprised of those publicly traded firms within the SIC 6000 range, excluding investment
funds, investment trusts such REITs, and all insurance related firms.

Given the consolidation of financial companies, the distinction between traditional and market-based intermediaries may
become blurry in specific cases. For example, Citigroup Inc. provides retail banking services as well as commercial banking
services, implying that it would be classified as a traditional depository institution. However, they also have an investmentbanking arm, which could fall under the market-based intermediary category. Regardless of this consolidation, Citigroup is
classified in this analysis by its SIC code distinction as a commercial bank (SIC code: 6021). While this introduces a slight
bias in the results, it is unavoidable. Fortunately, these types of firms tend to be classified as traditional depository
institutions, which biases against the hypothesis set forth in this study. Therefore, any affirmation of the hypothesis occurs
in spite of this bias effectively strengthening the results.
4 As of 2009, some very important market-based intermediaries such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became
registered as Bank-Holding Companies, and fall under this category based on their SIC classifications.
5 This category was included as a number of financial companies and mortgage companies fall under this category, such as
Lamar Capital Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Lamar Bank that is responsible for exclusively issuing subprime
mortgages. This category was manually cleaned of any non-financial firms.
3
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Extracting the data by the SIC code classifications purged the financial intermediation sector
of most types of investment funds commonly found in the 6000 SIC code range. The data was then
manually cleaned of any remaining firms that may have been inappropriately classified or should not
be classified as financial intermediaries, such as any non-financial firms in the Offices of Holding
Companies SIC category. Additionally, following Fama and French (2004), all American Depository
Receipts (ADRs), which are non-US firms listed and publicly traded on US stock exchanges, were
also removed from the data set. Given the data overview, this sample data is used to examine the
evolution of the risk behavior across intermediary types over time.

2.3.2. Empirical Methodology
In order to assess the risk differences across intermediary types over time, this analysis uses equity
market volatility following Campbell et al. (2001) and Houston and Stiroh (2005). The roots of
equity-based measures of risk can be traced back to the early financial literature linked to CAPM,
which decomposed the return of a given stock into two risk components: systematic or market risk
and idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk. Campbell et al (2001) expand this model (henceforth CLMX
model) to decompose the total return volatility of a given stock into three components: the portion
of the volatility due to the market, the portion due to the industry, and the portion due to the firm.
In addition to each of these components summing to the total return volatility, it has the added
benefit of eliminating both firm-specific betas, which can be unstable over time, and covariances
from the model calculations. The approach follows a two-part CAPM framework with separate
equations for excess industry returns and excess firm-specific returns. The model output will yield
both an industry measure of risk across the intermediary groups as well as a firm-specific measure of
risk that is averaged across the industry for the market-based and traditional financial intermediaries.
Since this analysis focuses on the risk behavior of two individual industries, the general CLMX model
is substituted for the individual industry version from Campbell et al. (2001) outlined below.
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Prior to the model estimation, three different excess return measures for the market, the
industries, and the firms are constructed. Let !!"#   denote the excess stock return, relative to the onemonth Treasury bill rate, of firm j in industry i at time t. Additionally, the weight of firm j in industry
i at time t, based on the previous period’s market capitalization, is defined as !!"# . These definitions
imply that the excess return of industry i at time t equals the weighted average of the individual firm
returns within that industry: !!" =

!∈! !!"# !!"# .

Using the same approach, the excess market

return is equal to the weighted average of the excess industry returns at time t. By defining the
weight of industry i in the whole market at time t as !!" , the formula for the excess market return is
!!" =

!∈! !!" !!" .

After calculating the key excess return variables, the CLMX individual

industry model is estimated.
The CLMX model, when applied to individual industries, yields a two-equation estimation
approach, one equation to obtain the industry volatility and the other to assess the firm-specific
volatility within the industry. The decomposition of these measures requires the estimation of
industry specific betas through a regression of the excess industry returns on the excess market
returns:
!. !         !!" = !!" !!" + !!"
Since the Gauss-Markov assumptions dictate that !!" is orthogonal to !!" , the volatility of the
industry return is equal to the variance of equation [2.1]:
!. !         !"#(!!" ) = !!!" !"#(!!" ) + !!!!"
In equation [2.2], the variance of !!" is denoted as !!!!" , and represents the measure of industry
volatility. The second part of the decomposition expands upon equation [2.1] to analyze the firm
specific return through the following:
!. !         !!"# = !!" !!" + !!" + !!"#
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where the firm-specific returns rely on the industry returns and a firm specific residual. Equation
[2.3] can also be written as !!"# = !!" + !!"# which is derived from the firm-specific, beta-free,
model construction of Campbell et al. (2001).6 The goal in the second stage is to obtain a measure of
firm-specific volatility that is averaged across industries, which is calculated from equation [2.3] for
the weighted average of the volatility of the firm-specific returns (i.e. the variance of equation [2.3]):

!. !         

!"#

!!"# !"#(!!"# ) = !!!" !"# !!" + !!!!" + !!!!"#

The variance of the residual in equation [2.3], !"#(!!"# ), is denoted !!!!"# in equation [2.4] and
represents the firm-level volatility across the individual industries. To obtain the actual estimates for
!!!!" and !!!!"# , equation [2.1] is estimated for each month using OLS over daily data (i.e. equation
[2.1] is estimated using daily data, for each industry over each month, yielding a monthly industry
beta and a series of daily residuals for each industry in each month). The industry volatility measure,
!!!!! is calculated as the variance of the residuals for each month in each industry. The firm-specific
volatility is estimated by taking the variance of the daily residuals in equation [2.4] by each month and
industry. Using this approach will allow for a comparison of the risk differences between the marketbased financial intermediaries and the traditional intermediaries over time.

2.3.3. Results: The Evolution of Risk Between Market-Based and Traditional Financial
Intermediaries
The output from the individual industry version of the CLMX model yields two risk measures of
interest for every industry. The first measure captures the volatility of the industry as a whole, while
the second measure contains the average firm-level volatility within each industry. The results
regarding the market-based and traditional intermediary industries from estimating the CLMX model

When converting this equation to variance and averaging the firm volatilities across industries, both the firm-specific betas
and covariances are canceled out. See Campbell et al. (2001) for more information regarding the theoretical construction of
this econometric approach.
6
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are reported in Figures 2.2-2.5. The figures contain both the monthly volatility measures and the
twelve-month backward moving average depiction of the risk measures, with one-standard deviation
confidence bands. The risk behaviors are examined over the monthly sample period from 1980:12010:12.7
Figures 2.2-2.3 graph the industry-level volatility over time of these two financial market
segments, while figures 2.4-2.5 display the average firm-level volatility across each industry for these
periods. While examining the volatility measures across 49 industries, Campbell et al. (2001) found
considerable variations across the industry-level volatility measures and noted that firm-level volatility
tended to be larger than industry-level volatility. In comparing, the industry-level measures for both
types of financial intermediaries with their average firm-level industry counterparts across the figures,
the Campbell et al. (2001) relationship of larger average firm-level volatility relative to industry-level
volatility is confirmed. While the previous literature found variation across sectors using the industrylevel approach, given that both industries in this context are subsets of the financial industry, they are
found to exhibit strikingly similar risk behaviors over this period, as shown in Figures 2.2-2.3.
While the risk behaviors of these industries, as a whole, exhibit similar volatilities over time,
the examination of the firm-level behavior within these industries tells a different story. Figures 2.42.5 display the average firm-level volatility across the traditional and market-based intermediary
groups over the sample period. Contrary to the industry volatility, there are clear differences in the
firm-level volatilities, as the market-based intermediaries over the whole sample tend to exhibit
slightly higher levels of volatility. From a statistical significance perspective, these two financial
industries display similar behaviors throughout the 1980’s and early 90’s, and from 2004 through the
present. Most noteworthy, however, is the ten-year period from about January 1994 through January
2004 where the market-based intermediaries exhibit a much larger, statistically relevant, deviation in
their risk behaviors from their traditional counterparts. The results suggest that the risk behaviors, as

A shortened sample period from 1980:1-2007:12 is also examined and the results are reported in Tables A.1 – A.4 in
Appendix A. The conclusions regarding this analysis are robust to this specification.
7
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Figure 2.2: Industry-Level Volatility Across Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries 1980-2010

**This graph compares the equity-based industry-level volatility of the market-based and traditional financial intermediary sectors, as
derived from the CLMX model
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Figure 2.3: The 12-month Backward Moving Average Industry-Level Volatility Across
Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries 1980-2010

**This graph compares the equity-based industry-level volatility of the market-based and traditional financial intermediary sectors, as
derived from the CLMX model
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Figure 2.4: Average Firm-Level Volatility Across Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediary Industries 1980-2010

**This graph compares the equity-based average firm-level volatility within each of the market-based and traditional financial
intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX model
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Figure 2.5: The 12-month Backward Moving Average of the Average Firm-Level Volatility Across Traditional and Market-Based
Financial Intermediary Industries 1980-2010

**This graph compares the equity-based average firm-level volatility within each of the market-based and traditional financial
intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX model

26

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
measured by the firm-level volatilities from the CLMX model, across the traditional and marketbased financial intermediaries have indeed evolved over time.

2.4. Explaining the Evolution: Data, Methodology, and Analysis
The previous section illustrates the differing risk behaviors across the market-based and traditional
financial intermediaries; however, it does not explain what factors are driving these deviations.
Previous literature has suggested that the changing competitive landscape, financial innovations, and
regulatory changes are responsible for the volatile nature of the financial industry over the past three
decades, and Poszar (2008) attributes these factors to the emergence of the market-based
intermediary sector. Given the risk differences, I examine which of these three factors is most
responsible for the changing nature of risk in the financial sector using a vector autoregressive (VAR)
approach combined with historical decomposition analysis.

2.4.1. Data Overview
The primary model specification will consist of an eight-variable VAR model with the key variable of
interest being the ratio of the average firm-level volatility of market-based financial intermediaries
relative to the traditional intermediaries as calculated from the CLMX model. The ratio allows the
risk behavior of both groups to be captured in one variable, and the final model specification utilizes
the log of the moving average representation of the risk ratio (i.e. the ratio of the results reported in
Figure 2.5). The graphical depiction of this variable is presented in Figure 2.6. The goal is to
develop a model that captures the factors that impact the risk behaviors of these firms, including the
three drivers of competition, innovation, and regulation, as well as financing opportunities and
general economic activity.
Economic conditions in this system are measured by industrial production, the consumer
price index, and the federal funds rate, with the last variable incorporating monetary policy behavior.
The accessibility of funding available to a firm will also impact their risk behavior, given the core

	
  

27

	
  
	
  
	
  
financing for the traditional banking industry is deposits, the value of commercial bank deposits is
included in the VAR. 8 The financing available to the market-based firms takes several forms
including asset-backed notes, commercial paper, and repurchase agreements (repos). The total value
of repos outstanding for the Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealers is used to proxy for the financing
behavior of the market-based firms.9
Aside from the control variables, the three key factors of financial innovation, competition,
and regulation are also included in the model, where their impacts on the relative risk behavior over
time are assessed. In this case financial innovation will be captured by the securitization of home
mortgages. While there are several possible measures of securitization, the availability of data over a
longer sample period extending to the early 1980’s restricts many of these options, thus securitization
is defined as the percentage of home mortgages held by market-based intermediaries. This variable is
constructed following Adrian and Shin (2010b) where the market-based holders are defined as the
total amount of home mortgages issued minus the commercial bank holders. The final variable is the
ratio of the market-based holders to the total value of home mortgages.10 The data displays the
strong growth of securitization over time where market-based intermediaries held roughly 18% of all
the home mortgage assets on their books in January 1980, a little more than 50% by February 1992,
and about 70% at the end of the sample period in December 2010.

The three economic activity variables as well as the commercial bank deposits variable are all collected at a monthly
frequency from the Federal Reserve’s FRED database. The commercial bank deposits variable is the combined total of
checkable deposits, savings deposits, and small time deposits. All of model variables with the exception of the federal funds
rate are formatted in log-levels.
9 Primary Dealers are those firms that serve as trading counterparties with the Federal Reserve for the implementation of
monetary policy and represent many of the largest firms in the financial sector, while these can be banks, historically these
firms have tend to be heavily involved in the investment banking sector. Repurchase agreements are a primary source of
short-term borrowing for these firms, thus this variable reasonably captures the financing behavior of the market-based
sector. This data was collected from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
10 This data is from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Tables and was obtained in a quarterly frequency. It was converted
to a monthly series using a cubic spline approach (e.g. SAS proc expand methodology). The cubic spline approach utilizes a
segmented function to join the whole curve such that the first and second derivatives are continuous. For robustness, I
also construct the same monthly measure utilizing the Denton Method of interpolation, which according to Bloem et al.
(2001) is "relatively simple, robust, and well-suited for large-scale applications." To construct this measure, I used the
monthly measure of all U.S. commercial bank real estate loans from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 statistical release as the
higher frequency variable. After interpolating the amount of home mortgages held by the traditional and market-based
intermediaries, I calculated the percentage of market-based intermediaries holding home mortgages. Figure A.5 in
Appendix A provides a graphical depiction of this measure constructed by the cubic spline and Denton approaches, where
the results are nearly identical, with the average difference between these two measures equal to .115 and a standard
deviation of .209.
8
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Competition is a slightly more difficult variable to measure. The number of firms appears to
be a logical approach, however, with respect to the commercial banking industry this would be very
misleading. Using data from the Federal Reserve’s FRED database, the total number of commercial
banks in the U.S. in January 1984 was around 14,400 and fell to around 6,700 by the end of 2010.
This suggests that competition, by this measure was actually being reduced over the sample period.
However, closer examination shows that a majority of the reduction in the number of firms can be
attributed to the consolidation with the banks with less than $100 million in assets changing from
12,000 firms in 1984 to 2,700 by December 2010. While every asset size category greater then $100
million saw an increasing number of firms over the same period. Thus, there has been increasing
competition based on firm number at the larger asset categories.
To avoid this firm number issue, I have constructed a form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which measures the level of competition or market concentration within a given
industry. An HHI measure is calculated for each group of financial intermediaries as the sum of the
squared market shares of the 50 largest intermediaries in each group. A small HHI for a given
industry suggests a highly competitive industry, while a very large value implies less competition or
more concentration within the industry. Upon calculating this measure, monthly over time, each
industry displays increasing competition over time with an increase in concentration for the marketbased sector following the Financial Modernization Act, as consistent with expectations. 11 The final
competition variable included in the model is the ratio of the market-based intermediaries HHI
relative to the traditional intermediaries HHI. The ratio approach was taken to be consistent with
the structure of the dependent variable, which is the ratio of market-based intermediaries’ risk
relative to the traditional firms, and for ease of interpretation. For example, the value of this

The HHI measure was constructed using the complete sample of publicly traded companies, with market share referring
to a firm’s market capitalization relative to the market cap of the all the securities in that industry. However, this variable
may suffer some bias, as there were significant increases in the number of publicly traded firms listing on the exchange over
time, which would reduce the market shares, and bias the HHI towards more competition. By taking the ratio approach, I
believe some of this bias will be eliminated, as both industries are impacted in the same manner.
11
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competition variable takes a value of 2, this implies that market-based firms operate in an industry
that is twice as concentrated as the traditional banking industry.
The other important factor that has impacted the risk behavior over the period from 1980
through 2010 is the regulatory changes within the financial industry. These regulatory changes enter
the model as a series of seven dummy variables that represent the seven major legal changes over the
period. The seven dummies include the following changes: the Federal Reserve’s reinterpretation of
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act allowing commercial banks to engage 5% of their business in
investment banking activities (Dec. 1986), the Fed relaxes the 5% constraint to 10% (Jan. 1989), the
Fed again loosens this restriction to 25% (Dec. 1996), the Federal Reserve eliminates Section 20
entirely (Aug. 1997), the Financial Modernization Act which allowed for the consolidation of
banking, insurance and investment firms (Nov. 1999), the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(Dec. 2000), and the lifting of the “Net Capital Rule” which allowed firms to increase their leverage
(Aug. 2004).12 These variables will enter the model as exogenous independent variables in the VAR
model system.

2.4.2. Preliminary Analysis
The VAR approach is simply a system of individual time series equations, thus prior to any modeling,
a series of diagnostic tests must be conducted to ensure proper estimation and model fit. These
diagnostic tests include the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, the Ljung-Box test for white
noise residuals, and the Bayesian Information Criterion to examine the proper model lag length, the
Johansen Test for cointegration, and the Bai and Perron test for structural changes.Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests are used to examine the stationarity of each variable in the model. The results of
these tests for each variable in levels and differences are reported in Table 2.1 for the 1980:092010:12 sample period. The tests indicate that six of the variables contain unit roots and must be

One main piece of legislation, that is not included in the model, is the Dodd-Frank Act and the Consumer Protection
Act, which was officially passed on July 21, 2010 (Frank 2010). Given my sample ends in December 2010, and majority of
the regulatory changes were still in the rulemaking and research process, I excluded this change from my sample.
12
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differenced to induce stationarity, while the federal funds rate and securitization are stationary in
levels and log-levels. Additionally, the Johansen trace test for cointegration is estimated for the nonstationary variables over the sample period and is reported in Table 2.1.13 The full sample period
through the end of 2010 suggests no evidence of cointegration. These results suggest the full model
can be estimated using a standard VAR approach, with variables in their respective stationary form.
Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criteria is used to determine the appropriate lag length of the
model, which is four lags, as indicated by Table 2.1. However, as indicated by the Ljung-Box Test
statistics reported in Table 2.1, the twelve-lag model was the first lag specification that yielded white
noise residuals, while the four-lag model failed to produce this result. Thus the twelve-lag model is
used for this analysis.14
Examining a graph of the risk behavior across these financial intermediaries in Figure 2.6
shows a divergence across intermediaries beginning in the early-mid nineties through the millennium,
followed by a convergence of their behaviors leading into the financial crisis. I want to analyze the
impact of competition, financial innovation, and regulation on these behaviors; however, certain
factors may be more dominant in explaining divergence and others for convergence. The log of the
moving average risk ratio variable bottoms in December 1991 prior to the divergence of risk (or the
increase in the risk ratio) and peaks in November 1999.15 I define this portion of the sample as the
period of risk divergence and the period following November 1999 through the financial crisis in
December 2007, as risk convergence, where the risk ratio variable gradually falls. While these
breakpoints can segment the sample, the historical decomposition approach is predicated on
forecasting, which is not necessarily as effective at forecasting at a peak or trough.

The results of the Trace Test are robust to both the standard test, as well as the Bartlett Small Sample Correction version
of the Trace Test as reported in Table 2.1.
14 For robustness, the four-lag model specification is also considered, the results of this specification are reported in
Appendix A in Figure A.8.
15 As a matter of note, November 1999 marks the passing of the Financial Modernization Act, which led to consolidation
across banking, investment banking, and insurance companies, which theoretically should reduce these risk differences
across traditional and market-based intermediaries.	
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Figure 2.6: The Log of the Moving Average Risk Ratio with Regulation
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Thus, I also include several possible breakpoints or dates of structural change within the divergence
and convergence sub-sample periods for use in the forecasting simulations.
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) provide an approach to testing for multiple unknown points of
structural change over a given sample period. The first step in the test is to determine the number of
breaks over the course of the sample; I allow for a maximum number of ten breaks over the monthly
30-year sample and require a minimum of 24 months between breaks.16 Table 2.1 reports the results
of this test, with the left hand side displaying the BIC and modified Schwarz criteria from Lui et al
(1997). The BIC selects 9 potential breaks over the sample (note the BIC value at 9 breaks is
equivalent to the value at 8 breaks) and the modified Schwarz statistic selects 8 breaks, thus given the
overlap of 8 breaks, I estimate the Bai and Perron (2003) procedure accordingly. The results of this
test are reported in the right-hand side of Table 2.1 with the isolated breakpoints and their respective
confidence intervals.

During the divergence period, three breakpoints are indicated: 1993:05,

1995:11, and 1998:09. The convergence period from 1999:12 through 2007:12 contained only two

I also run the test requiring a minimum of 12 months between breaks, with the results being reported in Table 2.1. The
main breaks within the divergence and convergence periods (1992:01-2007:12) that I use in this analysis are robust to this
specification, although some of the break points towards the end of the sample are impacted.
16
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breakpoints at 2004:03 and 2006:12. For robustness, several historical decompositions are estimated
using the various breakpoints to test the impact of competition, innovation, and regulation on the log
of the moving average risk ratio. Two periods are estimated for divergence, 1993:05-1999:11, and
1995:11-1999:11, and two periods are estimated for convergence 1999:12-2007:12 and 2004:032007:12.17

2.4.3. VAR Methodology and Historical Decomposition
One challenge with examining the impact of the factors driving the risk behavior of financial
intermediaries is the endogeneity issue. For example, is industrial production in a given period
driving the risk behavior of these firms, or, as the recent financial crisis demonstrates, can the risk
behavior of financial intermediaries impact economic activity? Clearly, there is an argument for
endogeneity, which translates very well to the VAR methodology, which estimates a system of
equations, allowing every variable to be endogenous.
An eight variable VAR model is estimated over the monthly sample period from 1980:092010:12 in order to analyze the factors driving financial intermediary risk behaviors.18 The VAR
model is estimated in the following vector form:
!

!. !             ∆!! =∝ +  

!! ∆!!!! + !!! + !!
!!!

where !! is a vector of the eight endogenous variables and !! is a vector of seven financial
regulation dummy variables.

The ordering of the variables in the VAR model are industrial

production, the price level, the federal funds rate, commercial bank deposits, primary dealer repos
outstanding, the competition ratio, securitization, and lastly the risk ratio.19 The ordering of the
Given the proximity of the last breakpoint in each subsample, 1998:09 and 2006:12 to the respective end of the
divergence and convergence periods, I do not focus on these for HDC analysis.
18 A shortened sample period, from 1980:09-2007:12, is also analyzed to ensure robustness by excluding the financial crisis.
The period however required the use of a vector error-correction model, as evidence of one cointegrating vector was found
using the Johansen test, see section 2.4.5 for more information.
I also examine an alternative ordering that places the competition, securitization, and risk ratio at the beginning of the
ordering and places the economic activity variables at the end of the ordering (i.e. the competition ratio, securitization, the
17
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variables is important as it dictates the contemporaneous relationships amongst the variables used to
orthongalize the variance-covariance matrix. The above ordering was selected to allow all model
variables to contemporaneously impact the variable of interest, the ratio of financial intermediary risk
behavior. In that regard, the key macroeconomic variables of industrial production, the price level
and the federal funds rate are at the beginning of the ordering to contemporaneously impact all the
other variables, while they are followed by two forms of financing for the respective traditional and
market-based intermediaries. Lastly, the remaining factors of competition and securitization are last
in the ordering prior to the risk ratio, with competition contemporaneously impacting securitization
and the risk ratio and being impacted by all the preceding variables.
Support for this ordering can be drawn from Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010), in the
context of the macro risk premium, as competition amongst firms could force these firms to lower
their lending standards and accept lower investment returns in their search for yield (i.e. resulting in a
lower macro risk premium). In this context, the competition would be impacting the macro risk
premium, which impacts the firms’ desire to be involved in the securitization markets.
After estimating the VAR model over the sample period, historical decompositions (HDs)
are utilized to separate the historical or actual behavior of a time series into two components: the
base projection and accumulated impacts of innovations, similar to the approach taken by Burbidge
and Harrison (1985), Chowdury and Wheeler (1993), McMillin (1988), and Fackler (1998).
According to McMillin (1988), in order to analyze the HD over a given period, the VAR model can
be written in its moving average representation form:
!

!. !               !! =

!! !!!!
!!!

where !! is the vector of endogenous variables from above, !!!! is the column vector of shocks or
residuals from the VAR model, and !! is the matrix of impulse response weights that correspond to

risk ratio, commercial bank deposits, primary dealer repos outstanding, industrial production, the price level, and the
federal funds rate). This specification allows the key financial market variables to contemporaneously impact the
economic activity variables. The key results of the model are robust to this specification.
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the dimensions of Y and u. The HD breaks this equation into two components, the base projection,
which serves as the forecast of the series of interest utilizing all available information at time t, and
the shocks occurring after time t that close the gap between the actual data and the base projection.
If a base period runs from observation 1 to T, then equation [2.6] can be rewritten in the following
form:
!!!

!

2.7                       !!!! =

!! ! !!!!! +
!!!

!! ! !!!!!
!!!

In this specification, the first term in the equation represents the base projection or forecast of !!!!
starting from time T using all available information up to that point.
!!!
!!! !!

The second term,

! !!!!! , is equivalent to the difference between the actual series and the base projection, and

captures the portion of !!!! accounted for by shocks occurring after time T. For this analysis, the
last equation in the system, with the lag of the moving average of the risk ratio as the dependent
variable, will be decomposed as above.

The role of each variable in explaining the financial

intermediary risk behavior is analyzed by comparing the root mean square error (RMSE) deviations
of the actual risk series to the base projection plus each of the innovations. The variable whose
innovation, when combined with the base projection, comes closest to explaining the actual risk
behavior (i.e. contains the smallest RMSE), yields the most importance in forecasting the actual
series.

2.4.4 Results: Explaining the Varying Risk Behaviors of Market-based and Traditional
Financial Intermediaries
Using the HD approach, the role that competition, financial innovation, and regulation played in
driving the divergence and convergence of risk behaviors across financial intermediaries can be
assessed. The VAR model was estimated over the monthly sample period from 1980:09-2010:12 and
subsequent HDs were analyzed over subsamples corresponding to the divergence and convergence
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of the market-based and traditional financial intermediaries risk behaviors (i.e. the rise and fall of the
lag of the moving average of the risk ratio) and the structural changes indicated by the Bai and
Perron test. The first two HD subsamples refer to the period of divergence, when the market-based
intermediaries were exhibiting greater risk behaviors relative to the traditional firms, while the last
two subsamples highlight the period of convergence, when these firms gradually began pursuing
similar behaviors.

The dates of the HD subsamples represent the periods in which the HD

simulation was conducted and the results are reported for a twelve-lag model specification.
Additionally, two models were estimated for each HD subsample, one model excluding the
regulation dummy variables and one model including them, thus comparing the base projections will
allow for the impact of regulation on the risk ratio to be analyzed. A likelihood ratio test comparing
the unrestricted model (including regulation dummies) against the restricted model (excluding the
regulation dummies) was conducted with the null hypothesis that the restrictions were not binding
(i.e. the regulation dummies are insignificant).

The resulting chi-squared test statistic, with 56

restrictions (7 regulation dummies*8 equations in the system), was 135.57 with a p-value=0.00, which
rejects the null hypothesis suggesting the unrestricted model accounting for the regulatory changes is
the preferred model.
Graphically, the HD results, as shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, display the behavior of the
innovations and their ability to predict the actual behavior of the log of the moving average of the
risk ratio.

Each graph contains 95% confidence bands around the base projection from the

regulation model, which were constructed by bootstrapping the sample data with 10,000 draws.
These graphs present the main finding of this analysis, that regulatory changes have played the most
significant role in changing nature of risk across these two intermediaries, as the base projection from
the ex-regulation model is statistically different from the base projection including regulation
throughout nearly the entire simulation periods.

Additionally, it is clear that the competition

innovations have a greater impact on this risk ratio relative to the securitization shocks, as there are
multiple periods where these innovations, when combined with the regulation base projections,
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exceed the 95% confidence bands. On the contrary, the securitization shocks are statistically similar
to the base projections, which, suggests the changes in financial innovation fail to explain the relative
risk behavior of these financial institutions over the HD subsamples. These findings are robust
during both the risk divergence period of the 1990’s and the risk convergence period of the 2000’s.
To further confirm these findings, the HD results, in the form of root-mean-square-errors,
corresponding to the key financial variables of competition, securitization, and regulation are
reported in Table 2.2.20 Table 2.2 represents the forecasting ability of the base projection from the
regulation and ex-regulation models and the base projection (with regulation) combined with
competition and securitization innovations relative to the actual log of the moving average risk ratio
over the specified period. Thus, the closer the RMSE value is to zero, the better predictive ability of
the particular innovation over the HD sample period.
The first two HD sample periods present the analysis during the risk divergence period. In
comparing the base projections across the 12-lag models between the regulation and non-regulation
model, the resulting forecasts are improved by 75 percent (.831 vs. .211) for the 1993 to 1999 period,
and 75 percent (.475 vs. .117) for the 1995 to 1999 HD simulation period. The forecasting ability of
regulation is much larger than the 6 percent (.831 vs. .785) and 5 percent (.475 vs. .428) forecasting
improvement of competition innovations and the 7 percent (.831 vs. .773) and 14 percent (.475 vs.
.408) improvement due to securitization. The results suggest that regulation has had the biggest
impact on explaining the diverging risk behaviors across the market-based and traditional financial
intermediaries.

Since the previously mentioned LR test suggested the regulation model is the

preferred specification, the comparison of the competition and securitization innovations and their
effects is done using this model. After controlling for regulation, the addition of the competition

20

	
  

The results pertaining to the full model and all shocks are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2.
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Figure 2.7: Historical Decomposition Analysis for Competition, Financial Innovation,
and Regulation Effects for 12-Lag VAR Model Estimated from 1980:09-2010:12
HD Subsamples for Risk Divergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1993:05-1999:11

HD Subsample Period: 1995:11-1999:11
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Figure 2.8: Historical Decomposition Analysis for Competition, Financial Innovation,
and Regulation Effects for 12-Lag VAR Model Estimated from 1980:09-2010:12
HD Subsamples for Risk Convergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1999:12-2007:12

HD Subsample Period: 2004:03-2007:12
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shock in the 12-lag models relative to the base projection, improved the forecast by 9 percent (.211
vs. .193) for the first period and worsened the forecast by 19 percent (.117 vs. .144) for the latter.
The innovations in securitization fail to explain the emerging risk behaviors of the market-based
intermediaries as its addition to the base projection in each of these two cases failed to alter the
forecast by even 1%.
Given the three factors that drove financial instability over the past three decades, the period
of diverging risk behaviors across intermediary groups is best explained by the changes in financial
regulation. Additionally, the effects of competition shocks had a larger impact on these behaviors
relative to securitization. These results are also robust to the four-lag specification, with the exception
that the competition innovations consistently outperform the forecasting ability of the securitization
shocks.
The analysis of the convergence period from late 1999 through the financial crisis is reported
in the bottom HD subsamples in Table 2.2. The first HD period covers from 1999:12 through the
onset of the financial crisis. This table suggests that regulation again played a very important role
explaining the risk behaviors as the 12-lag model sees a forecasting improvement of about 43%.
However, I believe the true impact of regulation in this period is manifesting itself as the
combination of regulation and competition. The start of the convergence period was selected as the
peak in the data series, which corresponds to the passing of the Financial Modernization Act of 1999,
which allowed for the consolidation of various types of financial institutions, e.g. banking, investment
banking, and insurance. This regulation had direct implications for the competition within these
industries. This is evidenced by the forecasting ability of the base projection plus the competition
innovations over this period. Under the ex-regulation model, the forecast including competition is
roughly 38 percent (.406 vs. .559) worse than the base projection alone, however after controlling for
regulation the forecast ability of base projection with competition improves by 63 percent (.559 vs.
.206). In fact, when combining the regulation changes with the base plus competition improves the
forecast by nearly 57 percent (.479 vs. .206).
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The later HD sample period focusing on 2004 through the end of 2007 produces slightly
different findings then the previous models, as innovations in competition alone, relative to financial
regulation actually produce the best forecast. The effects of regulation result in a 34 percent (.186 vs.
.122) improvement in the forecast, while the competition innovation yields a 73 percent (.186 vs.
.05). However, the interplay between competition and regulation may be driving this result, as it
appears that the regulatory effects are no longer having a large direct impact on the relative risk
behavior of these intermediaries and its effects are being absorbed somewhat by competition. This is
evidenced by the innovations in competition in the regulation model which produce a forecasting
root mean square error that is very similar to the base projection with only a 1 percent difference
between the two forecasts (.122 vs. .123). In fact in this model the securitization innovation yields a
better forecast than the competition innovation over this period. However, examining the graphical
analysis in Figure 2.8, it is clear that the impacts of securitization are statistically similar to the base
projection, suggesting they actually have no impact on the converging risk behavior, while again the
competition actually displays a significantly different impact over multiple portions of the sample.
Specially, the competition innovations perform very well prior to the late-2005 portion of the sample.
In examining the two HD sample periods that comprise the diverging and converging nature
the of market-based and traditional intermediaries’ risk behavior, the two main conclusions can be
confirmed with respect to key variables of interest: regulatory changes have the most explanatory
power relative to competition and financial innovation, and the changes in competition across these
sectors have more of impact on the relative risk behaviors of these financial intermediaries relative to
securitization.
One more factor, that is not included in this model, is the growing systemic nature of the
financial industry over this period. Houston and Stiroh (2006) use a variation of the CLMX model to
show that the risk of the financial sector as a whole began to rise leading to the increasing systemic
risk, which reduced some of the idiosyncratic or firm-level risk, which could also explain some of the
behavior over this period. Additionally, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Morgan and Samolyk
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(2005) also suggest that larger, more diversified firms would tend to carry less idiosyncratic risk.
Given the financial consolidation of these firms, this would help to explain the impacts of regulation
and to some extent competition over this period.
On the macroeconomic level, it appears the driving factors of the rising risk behaviors of the
market-based financial intermediaries relative to the traditional financial intermediaries during the
1990s can be most explained by the changing financial regulations. Additionally, the changing nature
of competition within these industries had a greater impact on these risk differences relative to
securitization innovations. Of the three causes of financial instability, securitization surprisingly
played a less important role relative to competition and regulation.

The period following the

Financial Modernization Act in 1999 saw a gradually decreasing risk deviation across these two
groups, which is again most explained by regulation, which also manifested itself through the
competition changes.

2.4.5. Are the Results Robust to the Excluding the Financial Crisis from the Estimation
Sample?
The results from the previous section were generated using a sample period from 1980:09 through
2010:12. However, the last several years of the sample period coincide with the financial crisis and
thus estimating the VAR model with and without this period may alter the results. To examine the
robustness of the aforementioned results, I utilize the same HD framework based on a model
estimated over the 1980:09-2007:12 sample period. The same preliminary analysis is conducted for
this sample, yielding similar unit root and lag length analysis as above. This shortened sample did
indicate evidence of one cointegrating vector.21 The implication of cointegration is the necessity of
using a vector error-correction model (VECM) relative to the standard VAR model.22

See Table A.3 of Appendix A for the results of this test.
Given the existence of one cointegrating vector in the shortened sample period, this suggests evidence of a structural
break brought on by the financial crisis. To further confirm the robustness of the full sample (1980:09-2010:12), I also
estimate this sample period with the VECM approach. The results are robust to this specification.
21
22
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An eight variable VECM model is estimated over the monthly sample period from 1980:092007:12 in order to analyze the factors driving financial intermediary risk behaviors. The VECM
model is estimated using the Engle-Granger two-step approach, where the first stage estimates the
error-correction term (i.e. the deviation from the long-run equilibrium) using a linear model by
regressing the log of the moving average risk ratio on the five remaining non-stationary variables in
the model. After estimating this contemporaneous regression, the resulting residual represents the
deviation from the long-run equilibrium according to Enders (2004). The second stage of the
VECM approach incorporates the lagged error-correction term in VAR framework, with all the other
variables taking their stationary form. The inclusion of the error correction term allows the model to
decompose the short-run fluctuations from their long-run equilibrium, ensuring proper inference.
The period of risk divergence from this model specification mirrors the results of the
previous analysis, with financial regulation playing a dominant role. 23 Additionally, competition
innovations appear to have a greater impact on these risk behaviors relative to securitization. In
particular, in the risk convergence period or post Financial Modernization Act, the competition
innovations yield better forecasts based on their root mean squared errors and exceed the base
projection confidence bands. On the whole, the shortened sample estimation period excluding the
financial crisis validates the two primary results: first, that financial regulation changes had the
greatest effect on forecasting the relative risk behaviors across these two types of financial
intermediaries, and second, competition innovations had a greater impact, in terms of statistical
significance, relative to securitization in forecasting these behaviors.

2.5. Concluding Remarks
Over the past three decades, the financial industry has been dramatically transformed due to changes
in the competitive landscape, changes in financial innovation, and changes in the regulatory structure.
These three facets are often cited as driving the financial market instability over this period. These
The results from the shortened sample period analysis are presented in Appendix A in Figures A.6-A.7 and Tables A.4A.6.
23
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financial industry changes were complemented by the emergence of market-based financial
intermediaries, which provide credit intermediation to the market but utilize market-based sources of
funding relative to traditional depository institutions. This macroeconomic analysis chronicles the
risk behavior of market-based financial intermediaries and traditional depository institutions from
1980 through 2010 and assesses the role that competition, financial innovation, and regulation played
in their evolving risk behaviors.
Using the Campell, et al. (2001) approach and CRSP data, I estimate the industry volatility
and the average firm-level volatility within each financial intermediary industry. The results indicate
that the industry level risk across these two groups is strikingly similar throughout the entire sample
period. The average firm-level risk across each industry, however, shows that the market-based and
traditional financial intermediaries only exhibited similar behavior through the early 90’s and from
2004 through the current crisis. There is a stark contrast, however, in the ten-year period following
1994 where the market-based intermediaries exhibited much greater firm-level volatility relative to
their traditional intermediary counterparts. Thus, I am able to conclude that market-based financial
intermediaries did indeed exhibit greater risk-taking behavior.
Using the derived firm-level risk measures, I examine the impact of competition, financial
innovation, and regulatory changes on explaining the changing risk behaviors of these intermediaries.
I utilize the VAR methodology combined with historical decompositions to examine the forecasting
ability of these three factors in explaining the divergence and convergence risk across the
intermediary groups during the aforementioned period. The results overwhelming suggest that
regulatory changes or deregulation can best explain the relative risk behavior over the divergence
period through late 1999 relative to the other two variables. After regulation, the innovations related
to increasing competition have a greater impact, relative to securitization innovations, on the ratio of
the average firm-level volatilities of market-based and traditional intermediaries.
The period following November 1999 through the financial crisis marks the converging risk
behaviors across these intermediaries. It is no coincidence that November 1999 also marks the
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passing of the Financial Modernization Act, which allowed for the consolidation across banking and
investment banking firms. Over the risk convergence period, the changing nature of competition
played an important role, which was brought about by regulation, especially during the early years
following the Financial Modernization Act. In comparing the three drivers of financial market
instability over this period, regulation, competition, and securitization, securitization played the least
important role by failing to display any statistical differences from the standard base projection in the
graphical historical decomposition analysis.

On the other, hand the effects of regulation and

competition worked together to provide better forecasts, thereby validating their importance in
explaining the changing nature of risk across these financial intermediaries.
Having established these relationships, it is important to discuss their relevance regarding the
current state of the financial intermediary sector and their subsequent policy implications. One of the
major causes of the recent financial crisis, as noted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(2011), was the excessive risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries. This research aims to
further our understanding of this risk behavior. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this
research is the greater risk behavior associated with the market-based or non-bank financial
intermediaries relative to traditional firms, specifically as measured by equity-based risk.
Unfortunately, despite the post-financial crisis efforts of the government and regulators,
even four years after the crisis, it appears many of these market-based firms have failed to learn the
lessons of the past. For example, recent firm behavior, including JP Morgan facing significant trading
losses (Silver-Greenberg 2012) and the fraud and subsequent bankruptcy of MF Global (Gordon
2011), are the result of excessive risk-taking gambles that turned against these firms. It seems the
greater risk associated with these firms is still a clear and present danger for our economy.
The general policy prescription out of the financial crisis is the need for greater regulation
and control over financial intermediaries to minimize these risks. While the research conducted in
this essay completely supports this policy prescription, it takes this notion a step further by
suggesting that these regulatory changes need to have a particular focus on the market-based and
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non-bank financial intermediary sector; as firms of this type demonstrate greater average firm-level
risk.
Ultimately, this analysis extends the current research regarding the evolution of the marketbased intermediary sector to examines their risk behaviors relative to traditional intermediaries over
time and highlight the causes of this behavior.
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Table 2.1: Preliminary Data Analysis for 1980:09-2010:12 Sample Period
Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests
Sample Period: 1980:09-2010:12
Levels
Industrial Production (log)
-1.73
Consumer Price Index (log)
-2.52
Federal Funds Rate
-3.49 **
Commerical Bank Deposits (log)
-1.20
Repurchase Agreements (log)
-1.61
Competition (log HHI ratio)
-0.07
Securitization (log)
-3.75 ***
Risk Ratio (log)
-0.44

Differences
-5.07 ***
-9.11 ***
-11.14 ***
-7.79 ***
-11.33 ***
-9.51 ***
-5.28 ***
-29.22 ***

Critical Values: 10%(*) -3.135, 5%(**) -3.424, 1%(***) -3.987

Estimation Sample:
1980:09-2010:12
VAR Lag Selection: BIC/SBC
0
-1586.1
1
-13776.9
2
-14240.4
3
-14365.9
4
-14506.9 *
5
-14339.9
6
-14060.5
7
-13857.5
8
-13602.2
9
-13357.1
10
-13087.3
11
-12830.5
12
-12571.3

Johansen Cointegration Trace Test
Estimation Sample: 1980:09 - 2010:12
Rank

Trace
Test
Statistic

Small Sample
Correction
Trace Test

0
113.95
104.82
1
60.36
52.77
2
35.04
28.92
3
21.73
16.55
4
10.08
6.81
5
2.88
2.26
Significance: 5%(**), 1%(***)

Trace95%

117.45
88.55
63.66
42.77
25.73
12.45

Ljung-Box Test Analysis
VAR Equation:
Dependent Variable
Industrial Production (log)
Consumer Price Index (log)
Federal Funds Rate
Commercial Bank Deposits (log)
Repurchase Agreements (log)
Competition (log HHI ratio)
Securitization (log)
Risk Ratio (log)

Model Type
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag

P-Value Significance for
Various Lags: Q(lag)
Q(3)
Q(6)
Q(9)
0.962

0.976

0.739

0.951

0.566

0.750

0.703

0.005

0.004

0.999

0.974

0.981

0.028

0.003

0.000

0.812

0.829

0.366

0.920

0.698

0.684

0.980

0.999

0.999

0.977

0.942

0.039

0.984

0.994

0.999

0.992

0.976

0.948

0.979

0.963

0.991

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.984

0.849

0.220

0.967

0.979

0.917

0.672

0.881

0.684

Bai & Perron Structural Change Analysis
Estimation Sample Period: 1980:09 - 2010:12
Identified Breakpoints: M inimum Identified Breakpoints: M inimum
Break Number Selection Criteria
Time Between Br ea ks = 24 M onths

	
  

Breaks

BIC

LWZ

Breakpoint

Lower 95%

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

-1.25
-1.53
-1.94
-2.37
-2.74
-3.06
-3.3
-3.5
-3.62
-3.62*

-1.23
-1.49
-1.86
-2.25
-2.58
-2.85
-3.05
-3.21
-3.29*
-3.25

07/1985
03/1989
05/1993
11/1995
09/1998
03/2004
12/2006
12/2008

03/1985
01/1989
02/1993
10/1995
10/1997
02/2004
01/2006
06/2008

Time Between Br ea ks = 12 M onths

Upper 95% Breakpoint Lower 95%
12/1985
06/1989
07/1993
04/1996
11/1998
06/2004
02/2007
02/2009

07/1985
03/1989
05/1993
11/1995
09/1998
04/2004
01/2008
10/2009

03/1985
01/1989
02/1993
10/1995
09/1997
03/2004
09/2007
07/2009

Upper 95%
12/1985
06/1989
07/1993
04/1996
11/1998
07/2004
03/2008
01/2010
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Table 2.2: Historical Decomposition Root-Mean-Square-Error Analysis for Competition,
Financial Innovation, and Regulation Effects
Estimation Sample Period:

1980:09 - 2010:12

Div e rg e n c e Pe rio d An aly sis
HDC Sample Period: 1993:05 - 1999:11

12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.831

0.211

0.948

0.392

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.785

0.193

0.930

0.343

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.773

0.213

0.948

0.395

HDC Sample Period: 1995:11 -1999:11

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

No Regulation Regulation

4 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.475

0.117

0.506

0.165

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.428

0.144

0.414

0.128

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.408

0.117

0.503

0.166

Co n v e rg e n c e Pe rio d An aly sis
HDC Sample Period: 1999:12 -2007:12

4 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.406

0.232

0.527

0.335

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.559

0.206

0.755

0.264

0.286

0.244

0.543

0.336

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k
HDC Sample Period: 2004:03 -2007:12

	
  

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

4 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.186

0.122

0.293

0.139

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.055

0.123

0.510

0.169

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.241

0.114

0.291

0.144
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CHAPTER 3
THE MARKET SURVIVAL OF PUBLICLY-TRADED TRADITIONAL AND
MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
3.1. Introduction
As chronicled by Adrian and Shin (2010b), since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic shift away
from the traditional deposit-based financial intermediaries (i.e. standard commercial banks), towards
the growth and emergence of market-based intermediaries such as securities broker-dealers and
shadow banks24 (investment banks and asset-backed security issuers for example). The latter form of
institutional structure has played a critical part in the development of market securitization and has
been gaining market share with respect to the traditional commercial banking sector.

While

traditional financial intermediaries function as depository institutions, using their customer deposits
for a large portion of investment funds, the market-based intermediaries rely heavily on short-term
borrowing channels such as commercial paper or repos as sources of capital.
Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2011) analyze the behavioral differences of these two types of
intermediaries in the form of their balance sheet behavior and leverage ratios. The research indicates
that the market-based intermediaries display a stronger procyclical asset to leverage growth
relationship, suggesting greater balance sheet volatility relative to the traditional depository
institutions. In other words, since market-based firms increase their leverage more during asset
booms and decrease their leverage more during asset busts, relative to traditional firms, these marketbased intermediaries will have more volatile fluctuations in their balance sheets. Additionally, the
previous chapter of this dissertation compares the average firm-level volatility, or the portion of total
stock return volatility due to the firm, across these two intermediary groups. This analysis finds that
According to Pozsar et al (2010), shadow banks are “financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity
transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees.”
24
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market-based financial intermediaries exhibited greater firm-level volatility relative to the traditional
financial intermediaries beginning around 1994 through the mid 2000’s.
Using these balance sheet differences and firm-level stock price volatilities as a basis, the
primary purpose of this paper is to compare the stock market delisting behavior of market-based and
traditional financial intermediaries. Additionally, I examine the role of idiosyncratic risk in explaining
this survival behavior. The primary hypothesis argues that the greater balance sheet and firm-specific
stock price volatility of the market-based firms, i.e. greater risk, will lead to lower relative survival
rates and greater cumulative incidences of stock market cause-specific delisting behavior for the
market-based institutions.
One implication of the aforementioned risk differences across these firms is the impact this
behavior has on the stock market survival for publicly traded entities falling into the two intermediary
categories. Exploiting the Kaplan-Meier estimator from the field of survival analysis (Therneau and
Grambsch 2000), survival functions with respect to stock market delisting are estimated for each
intermediary group over a sample of firms that were newly listed on the exchange within the
1980Q1-2009Q4 period. Given that publicly traded firms can delist for several different reasons,
cause-specific cumulative incidence functions are also calculated to analyze the probability of each of
these intermediary groups losing exchange traded status due to firm failure/liquidation/poor
performance or due to a merger or acquisition event. The resulting functions indicate that publicly
traded market-based intermediaries carry a much lower survival rate in terms of general stock market
delisting over-time in comparison to the traditional intermediaries. Upon dissecting this delisting
behavior into two separate causes, in both instances, firm failure and M&A activity, the cumulative
incidence functions show greater likelihood of event occurrence associated with the security broker
dealers and shadow banks. This analysis confirms the second hypothesis set forth in this research.
Lastly, in order to link the greater cumulative incidences of delisting behaviors associated
with the market-based intermediaries and their firm-specific risk behavior, a competing risks
variation of the Cox Proportional Hazards model is estimated to obtain covariate effects. Across all

	
  

50

	
  
	
  
	
  
model specifications, idiosyncratic risk has a strong positive and significant impact with respect to
delisting due to firm failure. These results indicate that a portion of the survival behavior can be
explained by this risk-based measure.

On the mergers and acquisition delisting behavior,

idiosyncratic risk plays an important negative role with respect to these actions for the market-based
intermediaries, while having no impact, or possibly a canceling effect on the traditional
intermediaries.
On the whole this analysis extends the previous literature regarding balance sheet and firmlevel stock price volatility differences across intermediary types to examine the market survival of the
publicly traded financial intermediaries.

After briefly outlining the data used for this study, I

highlight the different balance sheet and stock price volatility behaviors across the market-based and
traditional financial firms. Following this motivation, the main hypothesis is examined followed by a
series of robustness tests and ultimately some concluding remarks.

3.2. Data Overview
This research focuses on assessing the risk behavior of two narrow groups of publicly traded firms
taking both stock market-based and accounting-based factors into account. The market-based data is
obtained via the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) Stock Price database while the firmlevel balance sheet information is collected from the Compustat database. Given that the focus is on
the delisting behavior relative to market age, I restrict my sample to only those financial firms that
have newly listed on the exchange from the first quarter of 1980 through the last quarter of 2009.
Adrian and Shin (2010a) indicate that market-based intermediaries entered the market in the mideighties and gradually obtained market share of assets over the next twenty-five years.25 The sample
period selected for this study roughly coincides with this period.
In order to extract the financial intermediaries from the CRSP database, I utilize the SIC
code classification system similar to the approach of Archaya et al (2010).

25

	
  

The Office of

The robustness section also provides an alternative estimation period focusing on the latter half of the sample period.
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Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA 2011) has categorized firms in finance,
insurance, and real estate as the division of SIC codes within the 6000 range. Adrian and Shin (2010c)
define traditional depository-based intermediaries as commercial banks and the market-based
intermediaries as security broker dealers and shadow banks. The shadow banking sector, according
to Adrian and Shin (2010c), includes asset-backed security (ABS) issuers, finance companies, and
funding companies according the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds guide (Federal Reserve
Governors 2011). Following their defined market segments, I aligned those specifications as closely
as possible with the SIC codes to create the samples of financial intermediary groups.26
The sample of traditional financial intermediaries is comprised of those publicly traded firms
within the Depository Institutions category (i.e. within the SIC code range of 6000-6099). The
market-based intermediaries sample is constructed based on a combination of several different
categories including the Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, and Exchanges classification
(codes 6200-6299) and the Non-depository Credit Institutions (codes 6100-6199). The former group
obviously captures the security broker dealers. The shadow bank segment is comprised of the nondepository institutions such as credit institutions and mortgage brokers, both of which can proxy for
ABS issuers. Lastly, I include two more classifications in the market-based intermediaries’ sample:
Offices of Bank Holding Companies27 (SIC code 6712) and Offices of Holding Companies, Not
Elsewhere Classified (SIC code 6719).28 These two categories are included to mirror the finance and
funding company components of Adrian and Shin’s (2010) specification. Ultimately, the complete

Given the consolidation of financial companies, the distinction between traditional and market-based intermediaries may
become blurry in specific cases. For example, Citigroup Inc. provides retail banking services as well as commercial banking
services, implying that it would be classified as a traditional depository institution. However, they also have an investmentbanking arm, which could fall under the market-based intermediary category. Regardless of this consolidation, Citigroup is
classified in this analysis by its SIC code distinction as a commercial bank (SIC code: 6021). While this introduces a slight
bias in the results, it is difficult to avoid. Fortunately, these types of firms tend to be classified as traditional depository
institutions, which biases against the hypothesis set forth in this study. Therefore, any affirmation of the hypothesis occurs
in spite of this bias effectively strengthening the results.
27 As of 2009, some very important market-based intermediaries such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became
registered as Bank-Holding Companies, and fall under this category based on their SIC classifications.
28 While not reported here, the results of this analysis are robust to excluding these three categories allowing for a sharper
definition of market-based intermediaries, with the exception of idiosyncratic risk losing it’s significance with respect to
M&A activity for market-based intermediaries.	
  
26
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sample is comprised of those publicly traded firms within the SIC 6000 range, excluding investment
funds, investment trusts such REITs, and all insurance related firms.
Extracting the data by the SIC code classifications purged the data of most types of
investment funds and insurance related companies commonly found in this financial category. The
data was then manually cleaned of any remaining firms that may have been inappropriately classified
or should not be classified as financial intermediaries, such as non-financial firms in the Offices of
Holding Companies SIC category. Additionally, following Fama and French (2004), all American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are non-US firms listed and publicly traded on US stock
exchanges, were also removed from the data set. I also stipulate that firms must have survived at
least one-year on the exchange to be eligible for inclusion.
Coupling the above requirements with the restriction of examining firms that have listed
between the 1980-2009 period, a sample of roughly 2100 firms was created. The CRSP data provides
market-based performance and activity for all firms in the sample; however, this data must be
matched with the quarterly corporate balance sheet information in the Compustat database. After
matching the CRSP data with the Compustat data, using each security’s CUSIP29 as an identifier, and
excluding firms with missing observations,30 the final sample includes 861 firms with a total of 24,350
quarterly observations. 31 These firms can further be broken down into their respective intermediary
group subsets, with 490 traditional and 371 market-based. As a matter of perspective, the top five
largest firms in the final sample by average market cap for the traditional financial intermediary group
are as follows: Citigroup, Inc., UBS, MBNA Corp., Suntrust Financial, and Providian Financial. The
top five market-based financial intermediaries included in the sample are: Goldman Sachs, Deutsche
Bank, Morgan Stanley, Visa, Inc., and Lehman Brothers.

Every publicly traded US stock or security has a unique nine-digit code that serves as an identifier for use in clearing and
settling trades. This code was available within both the CRSP and Compustat databases.
30 In most instances, balance sheet data was not available for the final quarter of delisting, as these firms stopped reporting
information, thus the previous quarter’s information was used for analysis in the discontinuous interval counting process
format of survival analysis. Additionally, the early quarters of listing were also missing for several firms, the same process
was applied for these firms. Any firm missing observations in the middle of the sample was excluded from analysis.
31 As a robustness check, I also replicate the results using only the market-data, which allows for the full sample analysis.
29
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The CRSP delisting codes were utilized in order to obtain the trading status and delisting
behavior of each firm. The sample of intermediaries contained one of five possible types of codes.
Those firms with delisting codes in the range of 100 were considered active through the end of the
sample period in fourth quarter of 2009. Firms with codes within the 200 range were delisted due to
some form of merger or acquisition activity, while a code of 300 indicates exchanges of stock. Those
firms with codes falling within the span of 400-500 were delisted due to bankruptcy or liquidation as
well as bad stock market performance. Using these classifications, a dummy indicator variable is
constructed for the delisting and cause-specific failure status for each individual firm over time.
Given the data overview, this sample data is used to motivate and subsequently test the hypothesis
set forth in this study.

3.3. Motivating the Differences in Firm Survival Between Market-Based and Traditional
Financial Intermediaries
3.3.1. The Varying Risk Behaviors Across Financial Intermediaries
Following the financial crisis, a great deal of attention has been focused on examining the risk
behaviors of the financial intermediary sector and its subsequent impact on economic activity.
Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2010c, 2011) have examined the balance sheet behavior of these types of
intermediaries and their role in the financial markets, the monetary policy transmission mechanism,
and as predictors of national output. Specifically, Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2011) indicate that both
market-based intermediaries and traditional intermediaries display evidence of a pro-cyclical leverage
and asset growth relationship, while the market-based intermediaries display greater levels of asset
growth and leverage growth volatility relative to the traditional intermediaries. However, the
traditional intermediaries or commercial banks tend to function as a safe haven for borrowers during
financial market downturns when the market-based intermediaries reduce the size of their balance
sheets. Using this literature as a foundation, the balance sheet behavior of these two types of
intermediaries is examined over the firms in the sample. This balance sheet behavior serves as the
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foundation of the formulated hypotheses of this research. Since greater balance sheet volatility
should indicate greater levels of idiosyncratic risk for the market-based firms, this can translate into
lower survival probabilities of these firms with respect to stock market delisting.

Figure 3.1: Asset Growth vs. Leverage Growth of Financial Intermediaries
Panel B: Market-Based Intermediaries:
Security Broker Dealers

Asset Growth

Asset Growth

Panel A: Traditional Intermediaries:
Commercial Banks

Leverage Growth

Leverage Growth

Using the publicly traded sample of financial intermediaries from CRSP and Compustat,
Figure 3.1 displays the relationship between each firm’s quarterly asset growth and quarterly leverage
growth.32 The respective panels are separated by intermediary type, where Panel A represents the
traditional intermediaries in the form of commercial banks and Panel B the market-based
intermediaries by the security broker dealers.
The graphs indicate consistency with the Adrian and Shin (2011) as both types of firms exhibit
procyclical asset and leverage growth behavior. During asset booms where these firms see rising
asset prices, they expand their balance sheets even more by increasing their leverage; when the
market falls into a bust period these firms take steps to drastically reduce their leverage. The steeper
trend line for the market-based intermediaries serves as a signal of greater balance sheet fluctuations
across the financial cycles. The steeper trend line implies that the market-based firms increase their
leverage more than the traditional firms in response to in an increase in asset growth, and less than
32

	
  

Consistent with Adrian and Shin (2010a), leverage is defined as the total assets divided by the total equity.
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the traditional intermediaries in response to a decrease in asset growth.

Since the traditional

intermediaries display relatively weaker evidence of this steep relationship, it can be deduced that the
market-based intermediaries will have more volatile balance sheets that fluctuate with the financial
cycles.

Figure 3.2: Leverage Growth Density across Financial Intermediaries

As further evidence, the balance sheet behavior of these firms can also be examined within
context of leverage growth density functions. Figure 3.2 plots the density distribution of leverage
growth for each type of financial intermediary across all quarters of the sample. Clearly, the volatility
of the leverage growth is much higher for the market-based intermediaries relative to traditional
depository-based institutions. These volatility differences across intermediary groups provide glaring
evidence of differing balance sheet and risk behaviors across these intermediary groups.
For a more formal analysis, the second chapter of this dissertation constructs risk measures,
in the form of the average firm-level stock price volatility, for these two intermediary groups using
the Campbell, et al. (2001) or CLMX model approach. This method decomposes the total return
volatility of a particular stock into three components: the portion of the volatility driven by the
market, by the industry, and by the firm itself. Using the individual industry approach of the CLMX
model and the same financial intermediary categories as the data in this analysis, the average firm-
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level volatility of market-based and traditional financial intermediaries was compared, where the
market-based firms displayed significantly greater volatility over the ten-year period beginning around
1994.

One of the key conclusions indicated that market-based firms were indeed, riskier than

traditional firms based on this measure.
The differences between the market-based intermediaries and the traditional depositorybased intermediaries in the form of leverage behavior and average firm-level volatilities provides the
motivation for examining the cause-specific delisting survival of these intermediaries and the impact
of risk on this behavior.

3.3.2. Linking Firm Risk and Stock Market Survival
The main hypothesis of this analysis states that publicly-traded market-based intermediaries will carry
a greater likelihood of being delisted from the stock market in comparison to their traditional
financial intermediary peers. Previous literature has indicated that the former firms tend to exhibit
greater balance sheet volatility as well as greater average firm-level stock price volatility, which can
impact the survival behavior of these firms. Fama and French (2004) state the declining cost of
equity over the past several decades has allowed weaker and riskier firms easier access to capital in
the public markets via public offering. The direct implication of this phenomenon has been the
declining survival rates for newly listed firms. If the implication is that riskier firms stand a greater
chance of being delisted from the stock market following their offering or listing period, then a’priori
market-based intermediaries, given their riskier behavior, should conform to a lower survival rate
relative to the traditional intermediaries. However, while stock market delisting can serve as a failure
event for firms to be used for analysis, the situation provides added complexity in the form of the
cause of delisting. Specifically, a publicly traded firm can be delisted for several different reasons,
most notably through firm liquidation/failure, poor stock performance, or through merger and
acquisition behavior.
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Examining the factors that drive firm failure and acquisition as well as this behavior specific
to the intermediary sector has been examined throughout the literature such as Platt and Platt (1990),
Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Shumway (2001), and He et al (2010).

However, the literature

regarding the financial intermediaries has focused on the behaviors of the traditional depository
institutions, with no mention of their market-based counterpart. A recurring theme across the
literature is the role that risk measures play in impacting these firm behaviors. Platt and Platt (1990)
note that balance sheet leverage behavior is associated with greater likelihood of firm failure or
liquidation. Shumway (2001) also examined the predictability of firm failure across multiple sectors
and finds a positive relationship of accounting-based leverage as well as idiosyncratic risk with firm
failure.
In terms of acquisition, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that thinly capitalized banks (or
over-leveraged firms) are prime targets for takeover where accounting leverage shares a positive
relationship with potential acquisition. A case can be made in the form of Wheelock and Wilson
(2000) whereby these firms would be financially vulnerable to corporate takeover; however, this also
implies that these firms are in a state of financial distress, which could deter firms from wanting to
take on such a burden. Thus, it is difficult to anticipate a theoretical prior for the impact of
idiosyncratic risk on M&A activity. However, with the exception of canceling effects, I anticipate that
idiosyncratic risk should play a statistically significant role in these types of delisting behaviors.
Additionally, Amihud and Lev (1981) and Aggarwahl and Samwich (2003) note that one of the
driving factors for M&A activity is idiosyncratic risk diversification. In particular, Pasiouras, Tanna,
and Zopunidis (2005) state that product diversification is an important determinant in M&A
decisions.

Given that the market-based intermediaries encompass a wider variety of financial

services, such as mortgage lenders, ABS issuers of student loans, investment banks, etc., relative to
the standard depository institutions, these firms are more likely to be a target for acquisition as firms
seek to diversify their product offerings to reduce risk exposure. This motivates the notion that
market-based intermediaries should be more susceptible to acquisition on a relative basis.
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The main hypothesis states that market-based intermediaries should be more likely to be
delisted from the stock market as compared with traditional financial intermediaries following their
initial listing. At its core, this research is a time-to-event study, with the event being stock market
delisting, which is well suited for survival analysis. This hypothesis will be examined in three stages.
The first stage will analyze the raw survival behavior of the two groups of intermediaries with respect
to delisting from the stock market, which will allows us to explicitly test the hypothesis. However,
this stage fails to account for the cause of the delisting. The second stage will utilize cumulative
incidence functions to analyze the probability of each intermediary group delisting as a result of firm
failure as well as delisting due to merger and acquisition activity. While the previous stages provide
insight into the survival behavior of these firms, they do not account for any covariate impacts on
this behavior. Thus, the final stage in this process will examine the impact that the aforementioned
idiosyncratic risk differences have on the firm survival within a competing risks version of Cox
Proportional Hazards model framework as utilized by Wagner and Cockburn (2010) and He et al
(2010).

3.4. Do Market-Based Intermediaries Display Greater Stock Market Delisting Behavior?
Methodology and Analysis
The primary hypothesis of this paper regarding the survival of market-based intermediaries relative to
traditional financial intermediaries will be examined using the Kaplan-Meier survival curves and
cumulative incidence functions. Kaplan-Meier (KM) survival functions analyze the raw survival
behavior in the absence of any covariates and allow the examination of survival across various types
of data specifications, in this case market-based versus traditional financial intermediaries.
According to Therneau and Grambsch (2000) the KM estimator constructs survival curves based on
the analysis of the Nelson-Aalen (NA) estimator33 of the cumulative hazard function. The survival

The NA estimator represents the average number of failures from (0,t] for every firm that is perpetually at risk. Therneau
and Grambsch (2000) define the NA estimator or cumulative hazard, Λ(!) , in the following form:
33

  Λ(!) =   
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. In this specification, ! !! represents the total number of failures up to and including time t, while
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curve will describe the cumulative probability of firm survival over each collective group in this
model framework.34

Figure 3.3: Survival Functions against Non-Cause Specific Stock Delisting
Across Financial Intermediaries
Traditional Intermediaries
Market-Based Intermediaries

Traditional Intermediaries
Market-Based Intermediaries

Applying the KM estimator to the sample of financial intermediaries with respect to the
failure of delisting from the stock market yields the survival curves depicted in Figure 3.3. The time
period refers to the time from the firm’s initial listing on the exchange. In this specification, the
publicly listed market-based intermediaries display much lower rates of survival over time as
compared with depository institutions. Specifically, a broker dealer or shadow bank only has a 25%
chance of surviving 12 years (48 quarters) on the exchange after listing, while a commercial bank
stands a 42% chance of survival. These results validate the second hypothesis of this researcThe
above KM estimator approach allows for the examination of the survival behavior of the different
intermediary group types against the risk of stock market delisting, however a different approach
must be taken to examine the cause-specific delisting behaviors.

!(!! ) indicates the number of firms that are potentially at risk of failure at time t. Using this calculation, the NA estimate
of the integrated or cumulative hazard can be obtained.
34 The KM estimator utilizes the NA estimate to obtain the survival function, which takes the following form:
  ! ! = exp  [−Λ ! ].
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Incidence of Cause-Specific Delisting Across Financial
Intermediaries

Traditional Intermediaries
Market-Based Intermediaries

Quarters of Active Stock Listing

Panel B: Merger Delisting
Cumulative Incidence of Merger Delisting

Cumulative Incidence of Failure Delisting

Panel A: Failure Delisting

Quarters of Active Stock Listing

The survival functions simply explain the overall delisting behavior of these firms across
groups, but they fail to address the different causes of delisting. From a statistical perspective, Pepe
and Mori (1993) note the bias that results in the survival probabilities in a competing risks framework
due to censoring observations.

While the cause-specific hazards can be generated and yield

consistent estimates, the final survival probabilities fail to account for the other causes of failure due
to censoring.35
To correct for this problem the joint distribution can be specified using cumulative incidence
functions, which Porta et al (2008) suggest will represent “the probability of failing from a given
cause before a specific time.” In this case, all causes of failure are utilized to estimate the cumulative
incidence function of a given cause, and thus other failures cannot be treated as censored
observations. Essentially the cumulative incidence function approach will indicate the likelihood of
failure for a particular risk, while accounting for the other possible sources of failure, which will be
used to determine the respective delisting risks for each intermediary.

Censoring in this context refers to the failure of the survival function to properly account for various types of failure
events appropriately. In this context, if a survival curve for delisting due to firm failure was estimated, in each time period,
the number of firms in the risk set would change as a result of firms delisting due to M&A activity. A standard survival
curve would censor the observation, whereas a cumulative incidence function will control for these varying types of events.
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The application of the cumulative incidence functions to the cause specific delisting behavior
for each firm group is reported in Figure 3.4. Across both firm types, there is a greater likelihood of
these firms being delisted due to merger and acquisition activity relative to firm failure. Additionally,
the market-based intermediaries are at greater risk of either of these events occurring as compared
with the depository-based institutions. However, the distinction across these groups for M&A
activity is not as drastic as the case of the failure delisting.36 These functions, when combined with
the survival function, all validate the claim that publicly-traded traditional intermediaries will stand a
greater chance of staying actively traded on the stock market relative to the market-based
intermediaries in the face of failure or merger delisting risks.

3.5. Can Firm-Specific or Idiosyncratic Risk Justify the Delisting Behavior?
Methodology and Analysis
3.5.1. Cox Proportional Hazards Model with Competing Risks Methodology
While the above approach will allow for a comparison of the survival and probabilities of delisting,
they do not isolate the variables that may be driving these behaviors. Specifically, it is important to
address the role that firm-specific risk plays in these market behaviors. To examine this issue, a
competing risks augmented Cox proportional hazards model is estimated. This methodology is
frequently used in the IPO literature to examine stock delisting behavior across different possible
causes such as Wagner and Cockburn (2010), He et al (2010), and Wheelock and Wilson (2000). In
this context, I examine the various covariate effects on firm delisting due to failure or merger and
acquisition activity, specifically highlighting the impacts of firm-specific or idiosyncratic risk on these
behaviors.
For this competing risks model, it is assumed that every firm i can be delisted from the stock
market at any time t, subject to either firm bankruptcy/failure or acquisition. Let j=1 represent firm
The robustness section contains an alternative version of the M&A cumulative incidence functions, which are calculated
on a broader firm sample. Under this specification, the market-based intermediaries display a much greater likelihood of
being acquired relative to the traditional firms as shown in Figure B.2 of Appendix B.
36

	
  

62

	
  
	
  
	
  
exit due to bankruptcy and j=2 represent delisting due to acquisition. In this model j and t are both
observed as well as Tj, which represents the actual time of the failure corresponding to the type of
event.

Thus the final notation assumes that T=min(Tj, j=1,2) and that J=arg min(Tj, j=1,2),

corresponding to the actual failure time due to the actual event type. Following the notation of He et
al (2010), a hazard function can then be calculated for each type of failure event:
Pr ! ≤ ! ≤ ! + ∆!, ! = !   ! ≥ !)
!!→!
∆!

3.1                 !! ! = lim

After obtaining the estimates for the hazard function for each event type, the Cox proportional
hazards model will exploit these hazards as the dependent variable in its partial likelihood estimation
framework. The analysis of the hazard function in the competing risks version of the Cox model
takes the following form:
3.2                     !!" ! = !!! ! exp !!"! ! !!                                     ! = 1,2
In this specification !!! ! represents the baseline hazard (or the effect of time on the delisting
behavior with respect to failure type j when the covariates assume a value of zero), !!"! ! is a vector
of time dependent covariates at time t with respect to failure j for each firm i, and !! denotes a vector
of parameter estimates to be obtained from the regression.37 The end result of this estimation will
allow for j number of sets of coefficient estimates, one set for each respective delisting event in this
case.
The construction of the base model will follow Shumway’s (2001) approach of combining
accounting and market-based measures with slightly different variable specifications. The accounting
or balance sheet based variables will include a measure of the firm’s growth taken as the growth rate

In the face of time-dependent covariates, Fisher and Lin (1999) note the challenges associated with constructing the
baseline hazard and survival functions. The baseline specifications seek to explain the event behavior over time, which is
appropriate with time-independent values, as these will not change over time. However, in the face of time-dependent
variables, the construction of these baselines cannot account for the future changing values of these covariates, and thus
will be biased. The covariate estimates, on the other hand are valid, unbiased estimators.
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in assets, and a measure of the firm’s profitability in the form of net income relative to assets.38 The
market-based variables include the security’s quarterly excess stock returns relative to the valueweighted quarterly market performance,39 the relative size of each respective firm as natural log of
the firm’s market capitalization relative to the entire NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ market
capitalization, and a measure of idiosyncratic risk.
The firm-level measure of idiosyncratic risk is created in the spirit of Shumway (2001), where
this risk measure was created in an annual form by estimating the standard Capital Asset Pricing
model (CAPM) using monthly data. This process involves fitting a regression of the individual excess
stock return on the excess market return for each year for each security in the dataset. After fitting
the regression, the standard deviation of the monthly residuals for each security was calculated
yielding an annual measure of idiosyncratic risk. To construct the idiosyncratic risk in this analysis I
follow a similar approach, however I utilize the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, which is
an expansion of the CAPM approach that is known to be a better predictor of individual firm excess
returns.40 The idiosyncratic risk measure is estimated using the weekly data for each security and
fitting regressions for each quarter whereby the standard deviation of the residual is calculated.41

While the total assets measure appears in some form of each of these variables, a Pearson correlation analysis was
conducted and found no evidence of correlation issues amongst these terms. Shumway (2001) also included total
liabilities/total assets as a leverage measure. Given that the firm-specific or idiosyncratic risk can proxy for the variability of
the firm’s balance sheet, I excluded leverage from the main model. For robustness, I also estimated the model including
leverage growth as an accounting variable as shown in Tables B.7, B.8, and B.9 in Appendix B.
39 The market is defined as the index of all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges as extracted
from CRSP following Shumway (2001).
40 The Fama and French (1993) model regresses the excess return of a security on the excess market return and a risk factor
related to size and a risk factor related to book/market equity. The resulting beta for the excess market return indicates each
security’s systematic risk relative to the market, while the standard deviation of the residual is the proxy for the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk across the time period. The model takes the following econometric form40:
!! − !!! = ! + ! !!! − !!! + !"#!! + !"#!! + !!
In this specification the dependent variable is the excess weekly return of a security relative to the 1-month T-bill or risk
free rate,  !!! , as provided by French (2011). The first regressor represents the excess market return (measured as return of
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index of securities) relative to the risk free rate, and the last two covariates are the portfolio
factors constructed by Fama and French (1993). The SMB factor captures the difference in returns between small and big
stock (capitalization) portfolios, while the HML factor represents the difference in returns between high book-to-market
equity and low book-to-market equity portfolios.
41 Idiosyncratic risk is often calculated on a monthly frequency, whereby regressions are fit on daily stock market data for
each month and monthly idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the daily residuals. As such
idiosyncratic risk was also analyzed using the daily data over the sample as a robustness check. The results presented here
are valid using this approach as well.	
  
38

	
  

64

	
  
	
  
	
  

Figure 3.5: Idiosyncratic Risk across Financial Intermediary Groups:
Equal-Weighted Construction
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As a matter of perspective, the results of this approach coincide with the results of the second
chapter of this dissertation, where the market-based firms, on average tend to exhibit greater firmspecific risk. Figure 3.5 displays the equal-weighted average of idiosyncratic risk across the firms in
the sample divided into market-based and traditional financial intermediaries, where the former
category exhibits greater idiosyncratic risk beginning in the early 1990’s through the mid 2000’s.

3.5.2. Results: Idiosyncratic Risk and Delisting Behavior
Given the econometric overview, the initial results of estimating the driving factors of the causespecific delisting behaviors across financial intermediary types are presented in Table 3.1. The
estimation in this this table includes all firms in the sample that have been newly exchange listed at
any point within the 1980Q1 through 2009Q4 period and met the requirements laid forth in the data
section. This table reports the coefficient estimates across the pooled sample for the risk of being
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delisted due to either cause, delisting due to firm failure, and delisting due to merger and acquisition
activity.
The purpose of estimating this model is to examine whether or not the idiosyncratic or firmspecific risk can help explain the delisting behavior of these two types of intermediaries.42 The
results of this model specification signal validity to that claim for idiosyncratic risk as it relates to firm
failure for both types of intermediaries. In both specifications, the idiosyncratic risk measure has a
positive and statistically significant impact, which is consistent with Shumway (2001) and Wheelock
and Wilson (2000).

In regards to stock delisting related to mergers and acquisition behavior,

idiosyncratic risk plays a different role, in fact idiosyncratic risk is statistically irrelevant with respect
to this behavior for traditional intermediaries and displays a negative and statistically significant
impact for the market-based intermediaries.
In addition to the risk measure, the remaining variables conform with much of the previous
literature and intuition, as more profitable, better stock performing, and larger capitalized marketbased intermediaries are less likely to delist from the stock market. These intermediary types are also
less likely to be acquired if they are experiencing balance sheet expansions in terms of asset growth
and better performing stock returns. Traditional intermediaries follow similar traits in regards to their
delisting behavior in terms of market capitalization having a negative impact of delisting failure. The
mergers and acquisition delisting risk however, hinges on asset growth and excess returns for this
group.
Taking stock of the results thus far, idiosyncratic risk plays a key role in the failure delisting
behavior across both forms of intermediaries. While this risk only plays a factor in the merger
delisting risk associated with the market-based institutions. Can these results explain the greater

A pooled model across both intermediary types was first estimated followed by a Schoenfeld Residual test of the
proportional hazards assumption across the groups (Therneau and Grambsch 2000). The test indicated failure of the
proportional hazards assumption, suggesting these two groups should be estimated via stratification or as separate models,
as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Table B.2 presents the results from using a stratification approach, which assumes
the same covariate risk effects across the two intermediary types while allowing for varying baseline hazards. Since the
nature of this research is to examine the covariate risk effects across the two groups, the stratification approach of assuming
identical covariate effects and varying baselines may not be entirely appropriate, thus separate models are estimated for each
intermediary type as the primary results.
42

	
  

66

	
  
	
  
	
  
delisting rates and lower survival probabilities from the previous section associated with the marketbased intermediaries? Conducting a Wald test in the form of Allison (2004)43, across the coefficients
for both risk measures with respect to delisting due to firm failure, shows that the marginal effects
have a statically similar impact on the hazard estimates or the instantaneous risk of failure. Given that
market-based intermediaries display greater tendencies toward idiosyncratic risk, and idiosyncratic
risk is an important factor in the failure behavior of these firms yielding statistically similar marginal
effects, I can conclude that the idiosyncratic risk can explain some of the variation in the survival and
cumulative incidence behavior across these firms.
In terms of the merger and acquisition delisting risks, this variable exhibits importance in
explaining the market-based intermediary behavior, but provides no indication of an impact for the
traditional intermediaries. As previously noted there are valid arguments for both positive and
negative effects, as riskier firms may be more susceptible to acquisition given their weaker state, or
high-risk levels could also deter firms from M&A behavior. These conflicting impacts could be
canceling with respect to the traditional intermediaries resulting in the insignificant impact. The
negative effect of idiosyncratic risk for the market-based intermediaries, suggests their higher risk
levels should reduce the M&A activity in this sector. However, in spite of this negative effect, the
market-based intermediaries still carry a higher cumulative incidence of M&A delisting as shown in
Figure 3.4. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the very nature of market-based
intermediaries relative to traditional intermediaries in terms of product/service diversification. Since
market-based intermediaries are much more diverse in terms of the types of services they provide,
they are prime targets for M&A for the purpose of diversifying the acquiring firm’s exposure to
various market segments as described by Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopunidis (2005).
Allison (2004) provides the following Wald chi-square statistic for testing the differences in parameter estimates across
!
!)
two independent groups: !!! = [!.!. !(!]!!!!
. Given the null hypothesis that these coefficients are statistically similar,
![!.!. !! ]!
!
this analysis yields a chi-square test statistic of .046, which does not exceed the 5% percent chi-square critical value of 3.84.
Thus, this test fails to reject the null hypothesis and these coefficients are statistically similar. Note, the assumption of
independent groups is questionable with respect to M&A activity. However, in terms of failure, the failure of a particular
market-based intermediary is likely independent of the traditional financial intermediary group, with the exception of a
systemic crisis. But regardless, the null hypothesis is statistically similar coefficients, which holds in this case and supports
the hypothesis.
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Ultimately, these results indicate that idiosyncratic risk plays a significant role in likelihood of
a firm remaining actively traded on the stock exchange relative to delisting due to failure or poor
performance.

Additionally, the merger and acquisition delisting behavior of the market-based

intermediaries is also influenced by the idiosyncratic risk measure.

3.6. Examining the Robustness of the Results
While the previous findings provide convincing evidence of the risk-based differences between the
two types of financial firms, I examine the robustness of these results with respect to the sample
period as well as the sample of firms in the estimation. The findings of these robustness checks
confirm and strengthen the aforementioned claims regarding variations across these two types of
intermediaries.

3.6.1. Are the Results Subject to the Sample Time Period?
The sample selection process for data in this study included any publicly traded financial institution
that became newly listed or held an initial public offering between 1980Q1 and 2009Q4. The choice
of this sample period roughly corresponds to Adrian and Shin (2010b) and the growth of the marketbased intermediaries, which occurred midway through the 1980’s.

However, the comparison

amongst the intermediary types in the form of idiosyncratic risk, as displayed in Figure 3.5, shows
evidence of a shift in the risk behavior of these firms during the early to mid-nineties. During the
mid-nineties there is a very distinguished difference in the equal-weighted mean idiosyncratic risk
measures across intermediary groups. It’s possible that the sample period may be driving the
statistically similar impacts of idiosyncratic risk on firm failure and delisting from the previous
regressions. If this is the case, by excluding the earlier period from the sample, and isolating only the
firm behavior over the past decade and half could yield stronger risk relationships for the marketbased intermediaries in relative terms.
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In order to estimate a reduced sample that focuses on the later period where the marketbased intermediaries display significantly greater levels of idiosyncratic risk, a beginning date for this
sample must be determined. Essentially, this amounts to locating a structural break over the sample
period based on the changes in idiosyncratic risk. Using the equal-weighted specification for the
market-based intermediaries, as displayed in Figure 3.5, and standard Box-Jenkins methodology along
with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for lag length selection, a series of Chow Tests are
conducted to locate a structural break to segment the sample period. According to the augmented
Dickey Fuller unit root test44, the idiosyncratic risk measure for the market-based intermediaries is
stationary, as expected from its graphical depiction. The series was fit to an AR(1) process whereby a
series of Chow tests were conducted over several quarters to isolate an initial structural break.45
Clearly, the period between the first quarter of 1992 and the last quarter of 1993 indicates a
paradigm shift in the risk behavior of the market-based intermediaries based on the consistent
statistically significant F-values over this period. This suggests there is indeed evidence of a structural
break over the sample. Since the last quarter of 1991 is the first period to indicate a structural change
at the 5% significance level, this period will mark the truncation of the data sample for this
robustness analysis. Thus, the previous regressions will now be analyzed over the sample period
from 1992Q1 through 2009Q4.46
This sample was constructed by including only those firms in the sample that were newly
listed between 1992Q1 and 2009Q4, which results in a reduction of the included firms from 861 to
726 in the final estimation. The results of this model specification are located in Table B.4 of
Appendix B. 47 The limited sample period also reduced the idiosyncratic risk impacts for the
traditional intermediaries while simultaneously increasing the impacts for the market-based

Note, the typical unit root tests in the form of Dickey-Fuller tests or Phillips-Perron tests are biased towards finding nonstationarity in the presence of structural breaks.
22 A subset of the Chow test results along with the time series diagnostics are presented in the Table B.3 of Appendix B.
23 There is also a structural break that occurred in 2007Q3 due to the financial crisis. An additional model was also
estimated using firms that listed between 1992Q1-2007Q2, which also supports the previous results found in this analysis.
47 While not presented here, the impacts of idiosyncratic risk were also examined over the shortened sample from 19801992. In this specification, idiosyncratic risk lost its statistical significance for all cases, with the exception of the marketbased intermediaries delisting failure, where it had positive impact consistent with the previous results.
44
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intermediaries with regard to stock market delisting associated with failure across both model
specifications. 48 This result adds credence to the full sample model results.

The impacts of

idiosyncratic risk on M&A delisting activity are also echoed in this specification, with a large negative
impact on the market-based intermediary delisting.

3.6.2. Are the Results Sensitive to Sample Selection Bias?
The original data collection approach to this analysis combined the market-based data from CRSP
with the balance sheet data from Compustat, unfortunately this matching process caused several
companies to be excluded from the sample. Additionally, with the constraints of firm elimination
due to missing values from the fundamental variables of asset growth, profitability, and leverage
growth, the sample size was further reduced to 861 firms. However, the data from CRSP is complete
and thus the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the delisting behavior can be analyzed in a more
simplistic market-based only variable analysis, which also mirrors a model specification from
Shumway (2001). Given the structural break indicated above, I estimate the complete sample from
the 1992Q1-2009Q4 sample.49 The original sample consisted of nearly 2100 firms, and when the
sample period is reduced this leaves 1,447 firms for analysis. However, prior to the covariate analysis
the initial survival functions and cumulative incidence functions can be analyzed using the full data
sample, subject to the requirements in the data section.
Figure B.1, in Appendix B, presents the survival functions for the market-based and
traditional intermediaries over the complete sample of firms from the period from the first quarter of
1992 through the last quarter of 2009. The results mirror the previous sample whereby the marketbased intermediaries exhibit relatively lower survival rates.

As previously stated the survival

functions are valid against delisting risk, but cannot account for cause-specific delisting behavior,
Note, however, that application of the aforementioned Wald chi-square test from Allison (2004) still indicates that these
coefficients are statistically similar yielding a test statistic of 1.35, which again fails to reject the null hypothesis. These
results directly support the results of the previous specification.
49 The full data sample (including 2,135 firms, 1233 traditional and 902 market-based intermediaries) based on the 1980Q12009Q4 period was also analyzed as a robustness check. This sample also mirrored all of the previous results, with the
exception of idiosyncratic risk being negative and significant for the traditional intermediaries with respect to M&A activity,
similar to the effect for the market-based firms.
48
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thus Figure B.2 presents the cumulative incidence functions over the new sample. Again the results
under this specification are consistent with the previous analysis whereby the market-based
intermediaries carry a higher likelihood of delisting due to failure as well as merger and acquisition
activity. In fact under this specification, the delisting due to merger activity is distinctively higher for
the market-based intermediaries, whereas the previous analysis shows a more similar cumulative
incidence function across the groups.
If the reduced sample from the previous analysis does not suffer from any selection bias, the
full sample results using the 1,447 firms should display positive and significant impacts with respect
to idiosyncratic risk for the delisting failure across both intermediary groups. Additionally, the
idiosyncratic risk for the market-based intermediaries should also display a negative and significant
impact on the delisting due to merger and acquisition activity. To examine the full sample using only
the CRSP data, only the three market-based variables are included in the model in the form of
Shumway (2001). The results of this model specification are presented in Appendix B, in Tables B.5
and B.6. Table B.5 presents the results from the stratification approach, which yields consistency
with the previous analysis in terms of idiosyncratic risk behavior.
estimation while analyzing the intermediary groups separately.

The final table reports the

As expected the results of the

previous analysis in terms of sign and significance remain valid under the full sample specification.50

3.7. Concluding Remarks
The events of the financial crisis have called for a better understanding of the role that financial
intermediaries play in the overall economy. Recent research by Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010a, 2010b,
2010c, 2011) has placed great emphasis on examining the risk appetite behavior of two distinct
groups of financial intermediaries: the traditional depository institutions and the market-based
intermediaries in the form of security broker dealers and shadow banks. Using the Federal Reserve’s
Flow of Funds data, Adrian and Shin (2010a) highlight the greater balance sheet volatility associated
As the previous cases, the Wald chi-square test on the idiosyncratic risk coefficients indicates these are statistically similar
with a test-statistic of .77. Again, this supports all the previous specifications.
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with the market-based intermediaries relative to the standard depository institutions over the past
several decades. Additionally, the second chapter of this dissertation analyzes the average firm-level
stock price volatility across these two groups following the Campbell et al. (2001) approach, where
the market-based firms exhibit relatively greater volatility over the ten-year period beginning in 1994.
Given the previous literature has associated market-based firms with greater balance sheet
and firm-level stock price volatility, the main hypothesis of this analysis postulates that publiclytraded market-based financial intermediaries will carry of greater likelihood of being delisted from the
stock exchange for corporate failure, poor performance, or merger and acquisition activity. Using
survival analysis and the Kaplan-Meier survival curves with respect to stock delisting, this analysis
confirms that market-based intermediaries have a lower cumulative probability of surviving on the
stock market after being listed on a relative basis. The delisting event is further decomposed into
two forms of events, desisting due to firm failure and delisting due to firm acquisition. Cumulative
incidence functions are calculated to separately examine the cumulative probability of each separate
delisting cause occurring across the firm specifications.

The results also validate the second

hypothesis as both cause-specific delisting events indicate greater likelihood and risk associated with
market-based firms.
Using a competing risks augmented version of the standard Cox Proportional Hazards
model, the effect of idiosyncratic risk is also assessed with respect to the risk of delisting. Across
various sample period estimations, idiosyncratic risk has a positive and statistically significant impact
of the risk of firm failure and subsequent delisting. This variable however, only has an impact on the
merger and acquisition risk for the market-based intermediaries. The results of these models indicate
that the survival ability of the publicly traded firms can indeed be linked to the idiosyncratic risk
measures of the respective firms.
This research has an important policy implication, as it pertains to government bailouts of
financially distressed firms. A provision of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) established the creation of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is responsible for monitoring the potential systemic
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risk of the financial sector. This Council also has among their many objectives the task of regulating
non-bank financial companies and strengthening capital standards. This research provides further
ammunition for need and importance of regulating this specific type of financial intermediary.
Additionally the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) also places restrictions on taxpayer funded bailouts for
financial firms and enacts a number of provisions to strengthen the transparency and monitoring of
these financial firms in an effort to eliminate any potential, catastrophic, failures. In the face of a
similar situation reoccurring in the future, in terms of bailouts or even liquidity assistance from the
Federal Reserve, my research regarding the delisting behavior of market-based firms and traditional
firms also holds value. While the analysis was conducted over publicly-traded firms given data
availability, the results can extend to non-publicly-traded intermediaries as well, which suggests if
financial intermediaries in the future find themselves in the position of needing assistance from the
government or the Federal Reserve, greater caution must be taken with respect to lending to marketbased firms relative to traditional firms as the former is less likely to survive.
Ultimately, the market-based intermediaries not only carry greater balance sheet and firmlevel stock price volatility relative to standard depository institutions, but this risk also extends to
their publicly traded firm survival ability.
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Table 3.1: Full Sample Competing Risks Model
Full Sample
Balance Sheet Variables

Delisting: All

Growth

-1.965 ***

Delisting:
Failure
0.257

(0.000)

(0.817)

(0.000)

0.027

0.008

0.031

(0.190)

(0.905)

(0.118)

Profitability
Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

	
  

Traditional Intermediaries
Delisting:
Merger
-2.900 ***

Market-Based Intermediaries
Delisting:
Failure
-0.126

Delisting:
Merger
-1.034 **

(0.173)

(0.772)

(0.023)

-0.010 *

-0.016 ***

0.007

(0.063)

(0.010)

(0.571)

Delisting: All
-0.427

1.848 ***

-0.439

2.692 ***

0.116

-0.935 ***

0.962 ***

(0.000)

(0.424)

(0.000)

(0.488)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.162 ***

-0.966 ***

-0.056

-0.206 ***

-0.672 *** -0.039

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.245)

(0.000)

(0.000)

3.879 ***

8.092 ***

-2.959

2.957 ***

7.256 *** -4.373 **

(0.004)

(0.000)

(0.191)

(0.005)

(0.000)

(0.366)
(0.042)

490

490

490

371

371

371

269

46

223

250

80

170

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net income/total assets |
Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return and value-weighted return of all stocks listed on the
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP | Relative Size = ln(market value/market value of
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.
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CHAPTER 4
REACTING TO ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS:
THE TIMING AND RESPONSIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL
AND MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES’
DEBT-FINANCING BEHAVIOR

4.1. Introduction
While many lessons have been learned in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, one prominent
theme is the notion that the risk behaviors of financial intermediaries play an important role in the
U.S. economy. In better understanding this role, Adrian and Shin (2010a, 2011) have analyzed the
behavioral differences between traditional financial intermediaries, such as the commercial banking
sector, and market-based financial intermediaries, including security broker dealers and asset-backed
security (ABS) issuers. While both groups function as suppliers of credit to the market, the latter
intermediaries rely heavily on the capital markets as a source of investment funds, while the former
can utilize depository funds as a source of capital. A key finding of Adrian and Shin’s (2010a)
research is the greater risk-taking behavior displayed by the market-based intermediaries, where their
leverage fluctuates with more volatility relative to their traditional intermediary counterparts.
Additionally, Adrian and Shin (2011) also find that the equity component of both the market-based
and traditional intermediaries’ balance sheets tends to be “sticky”, in the sense that it follows a
constant growth rate, thus the debt-financing or borrowing behavior is the driving factor in
determining the final size of their balance sheets.
By combining the importance of the debt-financing behavior in determining the balance
sheet size, with the riskiness of the market-based financial intermediaries relative to the traditional
firms, a foundation has been laid to examine the responsiveness of this debt-financing behavior to
economic policy uncertainty shocks across these two types of financial intermediaries. In particular,
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this paper postulates two key hypotheses: first, traditional intermediaries will be less responsive, in
terms of magnitude, to economic policy uncertainty shocks relative to market-based financial
intermediaries, and second, their response will also be slower than their market-based counterparts.
Using a vector error correction (VEC) model, the above propositions are tested from a
macroeconomic perspective utilizing the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data for each of the
financial intermediary groups. The response of the financing behavior of these firms is analyzed in
the face of a macroeconomic policy uncertainty shock. Economic policy uncertainty is measured
using the recently created index by Baker et. al (2012) and consists of three components: uncertainty
highlighted by news and media reports, tax policy, and forecaster disagreements from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. Ultimately, the changes in debtfinancing in response to policy uncertainty shocks are analyzed across two types of traditional
financial intermediaries, small and large commercial banks, as well as two types of market-based
financial intermediaries, security broker dealers and asset-based security (ABS) issuers. The measure
of debt-financing or borrowing for the traditional firms is measured by the non-core liabilities of the
traditional firms and the total liabilities of the market-based financial intermediaries. In order to test
the hypotheses of this research, both impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance
decompositions (VDCs) are utilized to compare the timing and responsiveness of these
intermediaries’ reactions to uncertainty shocks.
On the whole, the key findings of this research do not confirm the first hypothesis. In fact,
the traditional financial intermediaries, in the form of small commercial banks, actually exhibit the
largest debt-financing response to economic policy uncertainty shocks relative to the market-based
financial intermediaries.

Specifically, the non-core liabilities of both traditional financial

intermediaries display evidence of a negative response to these shocks, however the VDC analysis
finds the shock lacks any significant economic meaning for the large commercial banks. The total
liabilities of the security broker dealers also respond negatively to policy uncertainty shocks, while the
total liabilities of the ABS issuers exhibit a positive response. However, the magnitude of the
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negative response of the non-core liabilities of the small commercial banks is by far, the largest, and
is statistically different from both types of market-based financial intermediaries. Given that the
economic policy uncertainty index is based heavily on news and media coverage, one possible
explanation for these results is the use and reliance of small commercial banks on the news and
media as a source of information. Since small commercial banks tend to have limited resources, in
terms of data and analysts, these firms may place more weight on news and media information in
their balance sheet decision-making process.
The second hypothesis regarding the timing of the reaction being faster for the market-based
firms relative to the traditional institutions is confirmed. While the non-core liabilities of the large
commercial banks respond immediately to economic policy uncertainty shocks based on the IRF
results, the VDC analysis, however, suggests that the non-core liabilities are exogenous to the policy
uncertainty shock. The small commercial banks, on the other hand, display a response in their debtfinancing behavior to economic policy uncertainty three quarters following a shock that lasts for only
one quarter. The security broker dealers also respond quickly, about five quarters after the shock,
with a large, short-lived (one-quarter) reduction in their debt-financing. The total liabilities of the
ABS issuers actually respond immediately to this type of policy uncertainty shock, and the VDC
analysis demonstrates this shock is economically meaningful for this balance sheet component, make
this the fastest response. Combining these results, I conclude that the market-based firms do indeed
exhibit a quicker response to an uncertainty shock relative to the traditional firms.
The core findings of this analysis expand the current literature regarding the balance sheet
differences across market-based and traditional financial intermediaries to include the variations in
the timing and responsiveness of their debt-financing behavior to shocks in economic uncertainty.
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4.2. Motivating the Differences in Debt-Financing Behavior Across Market-Based and
Traditional Financial Intermediaries
The purpose of examining the debt-financing reactions of different types of financial intermediaries
in the face of economic policy uncertainty is an important question with respect to how the key
players in the financial system operate in the face of varying economic conditions. This research
combines two strands of economic literature, the first strand, originating with Modigliani and Miller
(1958), analyzes the capital financing choice faced by firms, while the second, relatively new strand,
examines the behavioral differences between traditional and market-based financial intermediaries
and their impacts on the economy.
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, subject to a number of conditions,
when choosing to finance a particular investment project, the choice between financing the project
with debt or equity should not matter, thus the relative size of debt to equity on the balance sheet is
irrelevant. In the face of this framework, Adrian and Shin (2011) show that financial intermediaries,
both traditional and market-based, tend to display a “sticky” equity component over time, where it
tends to increase or decrease following a constant growth rate. The direct implication is that the
fluctuations in the balance sheet behavior and the subsequent financing of projects is being driven by
the debt-financing component of firms’ balance sheets.
Several possible explanations have been proposed to explain this notion of “sticky” equity.
For example, debt overhang is a common explanation during times of economic turmoil, as any
equity growth during these periods is typically shifted toward repaying existing debt holders, as noted
by Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2010). Additionally, Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlight the
distinction between firm insiders and outsiders, where the former typically earn both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benefits from the corporate control that coincides with equity ownership. As Adrian
and Shin (2011) suggest, these benefits and control can be a strong deterrent against issuing more
equity, which may dilute this power. This “sticky” equity literature suggests that the driving force of
leverage, and ultimately asset growth, is the debt-financing component of the firms’ balance sheet.
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Given the regulatory differences between traditional depository institutions and marketbased intermediaries, the latter group has been shown to display greater risk-taking behavior. Adrian
and Shin (2010a, 2011) indicate that the risk-taking behavior is displayed through the balance sheet
adjustments of these financial intermediaries. In particular, both types of firms exhibit a pro-cyclical
asset to leverage growth relationship: during asset booms these firms choose to increase the leverage
on their portfolios, while the firms de-lever their portfolios during asset bust periods. The marketbased firms exhibit a stronger pro-cyclical relationship relative to traditional firms, which suggests, in
the face of a positive asset growth shock, market-based firms will increase their leverage even more
than the traditional firms, and vice versa for a negative shock.

The second chapter of this

dissertation expands upon this financial intermediary balance sheet adjustment analysis to examine
the average firm-level volatility of the traditional and market-based intermediary sectors using the
Campbell et al. (2001) or CLMX model approach. This equity-based risk measure also indicates that
the market-based firms tend to be associated with greater risk relative to the traditional financial
firms.
Based on the risk differences across these two groups of intermediaries, combined with the
financing nature of the debt component of intermediaries’ balance sheet behaviors, a link has been
established to examine two key hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the traditional financial
intermediaries will have a smaller response, in terms of magnitude, of their borrowing behavior to an
economic uncertainty shock relative to the market-based firms. Two arguments can be formulated in
support of this hypothesis. First, if market-based firms display more volatility in their leveraging
behavior and frequently take greater risks, as suggested by Adrian and Shin (2010a) and the second
chapter of this dissertation, then they are more susceptible to potential losses in the face of economic
policy uncertainty than the traditional firms and will react accordingly.
The second argument can be derived from the role of core (deposit-based) and non-core
liabilities on a firm’s balance sheet. Kashyap and Stein (2000) analyze the effectiveness of monetary
policy with respect to bank loan lending behavior across different sizes of commercial banks and find
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that smaller firms, with small securities to asset ratios, support the bank lending view of monetary
policy, whereas larger firms fail to exhibit the same behavior. In other words, smaller banks rely
more heavily on deposits as a source of funding relative to large commercial banks. Accordingly,
since smaller banks rely more heavily on deposits as a financing source, which is less variable relative
to non-core liabilities, the response of large commercial banks relative to small banks in the face of a
macroeconomic policy uncertainty shock will be larger and more pronounced. The same logic can
be extended to compare the traditional intermediaries to the market-based firms, since the latter does
not hold any deposits or core liabilities on their balance sheets, their reactions to policy uncertainty
should be greater in magnitude.
The second hypothesis states that market-based intermediaries should respond to an
economic policy uncertainty shock faster than the traditional financial intermediaries. The two
arguments that provide support for the first hypothesis can again be applied for the second
hypothesis. Since the market-based firms display more volatile balance sheets that rely solely on noncore liabilities or market-derived financing vehicles, such as commercial paper or repurchase
agreements, they have both the ability and the desire to react quickly to economic policy uncertainty.
If we combine this behavior, with the notion that commercial banks act as “go-to” lenders in times
of crisis, due to their credit line pre-commitments according to Adrian and Shin (2010c), a solid
foundation can be laid to support the second hypothesis. During times of economic turmoil, when
market-based intermediaries choose to de-lever their balance sheets and reduce their lending
behavior, borrowers tend to lean on the commercial banks and their existing credit lines as primary
sources of funding. As a result, while security broker dealers and ABS issues may drastically reduce
the size of their balance sheets in response to policy uncertainty, by reducing their debt financing, the
commercial banks are forced to fill this lending void in the market, making their response to policy
uncertainty delayed relative to the market-based intermediaries. With the two hypotheses of this
analysis supported by the previous literature, I can focus on outlining the data and empirical
methodology used to examine their validity.
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4.3. Examining the Impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty on the Debt-Financing
Behavior: Data, Methodology, and Analysis
4.3.1. Data Overview
Both hypotheses are designed to compare the debt-financing behaviors across traditional and
market-based financial intermediaries. I segment the traditional firms into two categories, large and
small commercial banks, as well as two different types of market-based firms, security broker-dealers
and ABS issuers. The data regarding the traditional financial intermediaries is from the Federal
Reserve Board’s (FRB) H.8 Release, which provides an aggregate look at the assets and liabilities of
commercial banks in the United States. In particular, this data actually decomposes this information
into two separate balance sheets: the first comprises large intermediaries and the second small
intermediaries. The FRB (2012) defines large commercial banks as the “top twenty-five domestically
chartered commercial banks, ranked by domestic assets as of the previous commercial bank Call
Reports.” The small commercial banks are then defined as all the remaining banks that fall outside
of the top twenty-five largest banks. The estimation in this analysis will utilize the entire existing
dataset beginning in 1985Q2 through 2011Q4.
The liability component of the balance sheet for these commercial banks is segmented into
four major categories: deposits (including time deposits), borrowing, trading liabilities and other
liabilities. Unfortunately, several of the categories such as trading liabilities have been added recently
and thus have very limited information. Thus, the liabilities component of the balance sheet for this
estimation is condensed into two variables: core liabilities, which comprises the deposits category and
non-core liabilities, which is the remainder of the liabilities. Given that core liabilities tend to be
rather stable over time and since the focus of this analysis examines the debt-financing behavior, I
utilize the non-core liability component of the commercial bank balance sheets. This component
typically includes market-based credit sources such as corporate bonds and commercial paper.
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The goal of this research is to compare the traditional intermediaries to the market-based
financial intermediaries, where the latter group is captured with the security broker dealers and ABS
issuers in this model. The broker dealer balance sheet comprises many of the large non-depository
financial institutions in the U.S. including many investment banks and primary dealers. The ABS
issuers’ balance sheets, according to the FRB (2011), represent the “special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
that hold pools of assets (usually loans) in trust and use them as collateral for issuance of ABS.”
Since neither of these institutions use deposits as a funding source, they rely solely on the capital
markets for market-based sources of credit. As such, the total liabilities of the respective groups will
be utilized to analyze the financing responses in the face of economic policy uncertainty. In addition
to the liability variables for each of the estimations, a standard set of macroeconomic variables such
as the federal funds effective rate, real GDP, and the consumer price index as a measure of inflation,
are also included in this study.51
For this analysis, economic policy uncertainty is measured using the index constructed by
Baker et. al (2012). This index is constructed using a three-prong approach combining news-based
policy uncertainty, tax policy uncertainty, as well as the forecasting uncertainty associated with
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. There are two key
benefits of using this measure for economic policy uncertainty in this research. First, the index is a
realized measure of economic policy uncertainty rather than a deterministic measure, such as a
GARCH constructed uncertainty variable, which is econometrically preferred in the VAR/VEC
model framework. Second, this index also functions as a broad measure of policy uncertainty, rather
than one particular type of uncertainty, thus we can capture the general behavior of these financial
intermediaries in response policy uncertainty.
Specifically, Baker et. al (2012) describe their index as the combination of “the frequency of
news media references to economic policy uncertainty, the number of federal tax code provisions set
to expire in future years, and the extent of forecaster disagreement over future inflation and federal
51
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government purchases.” The news-based component of the index is constructed using month-bymonth searches of ten large U.S. newspapers for a series of keywords, including “economic”,
“policy”, and “uncertainty.”52 The resulting number of policy uncertainty articles from this search is
then normalized based on the newspaper article volume for construction. Tax code expiration data is
used from Congressional Budget Office reports to create the tax policy uncertainty portion of this
index.

Baker et. al (2012) determine the number of temporary tax provisions that have been

implemented over the course a year and combine them into an index using a discount value
weighting approach.

The key is the focus on temporary tax provisions, which often imply

uncertainty for many businesses and households. The last segment of the economic policy index is
based on forecaster disagreement in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Baker et. al (2012) focus
on three different types of forecasts: CPI, state and local government expenditures, and federal
government expenditures. These three quarterly forecast measures are examined one year in the
future and were chosen given the susceptibility of these factors to changes in monetary and fiscal
policy. The actual dispersion of these forecasts is calculated based on the interquartile range of these
forecasts and scaled using the median four-quarter-ahead forecasts.

A federal/state/local

expenditure policy index is then created from the underlying measures. The complete economic
policy uncertainty index is created by applying a ½ weighting to the news-based index, and a 1/6
weighting to the remaining three components, tax policy uncertainty, forecaster CPI disagreement,
and the forecaster disagreement associated with federal/state/local expenditures. As a matter of
perspective, the graphical depiction of this index is presented in Figure 4.1

4.3.2. Empirical Methodology and Preliminary Analysis
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the similarities and differences of the financing behavior of
various intermediaries in the face of economic policy uncertainty shocks, a vector error correction

See Baker et. al (2012) for more information regarding the index construction. There are several other keywords and
categories that are included in the construction of this newspaper-based component.
52
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Figure 4.1: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index

(VEC) model is estimated over the 1985Q2-2011Q4 sample period. 53 This analysis will provide
impulse response functions to explain the timing and response behavior of the liability components
to a policy uncertainty shock. Additionally, the resulting variance decompositions will reveal how
much of the variability in the balance sheet adjustments can be explained by the variability of
economic policy uncertainty shocks.

These two tools will allow for a comparison across the

intermediary types and an approach to test the subsequent hypotheses.
Prior to engaging in estimation, several preliminary tests and examinations are conducted in
order to ensure the proper specifications for these models. All variables are converted into their
respective log forms, with the exception of the federal funds rate and the economic policy
uncertainty index. The stationarity of each variable is examined using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
to ascertain the appropriate order of integration as shown in Table 4.1. All of the variables in this
study are nonstationary in their log-level forms, with the exception of the federal funds rate and the
For robustness, I also examined the same model estimation as a VAR in levels and a VAR in differences (except the I(0)
variables), excluding the error correction term. The result of the VAR in levels analysis supports the findings of this study.
The VAR in differences (except the I(0) variables) finds that the traditional financial intermediaries do display a larger
response, as the main results suggest. However, the IRF for the total liabilities of ABS issuers fails to achieve statistical
significance, thus the finding that market-based financial intermediaries respond faster than traditional firms is not robust to
this specification.
53
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economic policy uncertainty index.

While the federal funds rate is I(0) in its level form, the

economic policy uncertainty index requires further analysis. Over the full sample period, 1985Q22011Q4, the economic policy uncertainty index, according the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, is I(1).
However, when examining a graph of this index, it appears this variable is more stationary with a
structural break rather being strictly nonstationary over this period. This is evidenced by the results
of Perron’s (2006) unit root test for structural breaks in Table 4.1. Given this specification, the
primary model in this analysis will treat the economic policy uncertainty index as I(0) in its level form
and add an exogenous dummy variable to control for the effects of the financial crisis beginning in
2008Q1.54
In order to test for cointegration, the small sample correction form of the Johansen test is
employed using the nonstationary variables following Johansen (2000, 2002). For this analysis to be
accurate in the presence of unit roots, any long-run relationships amongst the cointegrated variables
must distinguish their short-run fluctuations from their long-run equilibrium (Enders 2004). In this
case, as indicated in Table 4.1, the Johansen test indicates one cointegrating vector, which validates
the appropriateness of the VEC model. Additionally, the optimal lag length for the VEC was
determined using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion
combined with Ljung-Box Q-tests for white noise residuals. While the BIC indicated one-lag length
and the AIC indicated two-lag lengths for this model, both specifications failed to produce white
noise residuals. However, expanding the lag length to three-lags, as indicated by Table 4.1 and the
results of the Ljung-Box Q-tests, suggests that this is appropriate lag length.55
The VEC process is a simple transformation of the traditional VAR model, which initially
estimates the long-run version of the equations in level and log-level forms (depending on the
variable) to obtain values for the error terms following the Engle-Granger two-step approach
(Enders 2004). These error terms represent the deviations from the long-run trend. The values of
The key results pertaining to the hypothesis of this analysis is robust to treating this variable as I(1) as well.
For robustness, I also examine a shortened sample period that excludes the financial crisis period. The resulting lag
length model specification based on the same tests indicated four lags. Thus, I also considered a four-lag specification for
the full sample period model. The results pertaining to the two hypotheses are robust to these specifications.
54
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the residuals, effectively the equilibrium error terms, are then lagged and inserted into a first
difference version of the VAR specification. This new lagged regressor will account for the long-run
deviations from the equilibrium, which corrects for the cointegration issue. After estimating the
VEC model, the relationships of the variables can be examined using IRFs and VDCs.
A Cholesky decomposition is used to dictate the structure of the contemporaneous
relationships among the variables. The ordering for the Cholesky decomposition takes the following
form: real GDP (measure of economic activity), the consumer price index, the federal funds rate, and
my constructed economic uncertainty measure, followed by the balance sheet variables, total noncore liabilities for large commercial banks, total liabilities for security broker dealers, total liabilities
for asset-backed security issuers, and total non-core liabilities for small commercial banks.
The first four variables dictate that changes in GDP can contemporaneously impact all
subsequent model variables and the policy uncertainty variable can contemporaneously impact all of
the balance sheet variables.56 The ordering of the balance sheet variables is based on the size of each
intermediary sector based on assets, as well as the importance of their role in the financial markets,
with the large commercial banks behavior contemporaneously impacting the broker dealers, the ABS
issuers, and the small commercial banks.57 Despite the behavior of all the different types of financial
intermediaries, according the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (2012) data, the large commercial banks
dominate this category in terms of size with roughly 7.10 trillion in assets in 2011Q4, compared the
1.95 trillion of the security broker dealers, and the 2.02 trillion of the ABS issuers. Given the size of
the large commercial banks compared to these other intermediaries, they are placed first in the
ordering as changes in their non-core liabilities will have large-scale contemporaneous impacts on the
other intermediaries.
The case can be made that the financial variables could be driving the changes in economic activity contemporaneously.
I also consider a Cholesky ordering that places the balance sheet variables before the general economic variables: total noncore liabilities for large commercial banks, total liabilities for security broker dealers, total liabilities for asset-backed security
issuers, and total non-core liabilities for small commercial banks, real GDP, the consumer price index, the federal funds
rate, and the economic uncertainty index. The results still support the findings of this study. However, all of the
intermediaries, except the ABS issuers, display no statistically significant response to uncertainty.
57 An argument can be made that the security broker dealers should be first in the financial intermediary ordering given
their role in financial markets. The results are robust to switching the ordering of the large commercial banks and security
broker dealers. 	
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The non-core liabilities of small commercial banks are placed last in the ordering as their role
in the financial markets is small compared to the other intermediaries and their activity is focused in
the local and regional markets relying heavily on deposits. Thus their behavior is least likely to
contemporaneously impact the other intermediaries. While ABS issuers are larger than security
broker dealers, in terms of total assets, security broker dealers are more involved in the financial
markets, including their role as primary dealers for the Federal Reserve, their repurchase agreement
interactions with large commercial banks, and their diversified pool of investments. Thus, the total
liabilities of the security broker dealers are placed before the total liabilities of the ABS issuers in the
ordering. Given the overview of the empirical methodology combined with the construction of the
economic uncertainty index, the empirical results of the analysis can be presented.

4.4. Results: Assessing the Size and Timing of the Debt-Financing Response of Financial
Intermediaries to Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks
The purpose of this paper is to examine the variations in the debt-financing reactions of traditional
and market-based financial intermediaries in response to economic policy uncertainty shocks.
Specifically, I analyze the difference in the size (magnitude) of these reactions as well as the timing of
the responses to the respective shock. A broad measure of uncertainty is employed in the form of an
economic policy uncertainty index, which accounts for a variety of macroeconomic uncertainties.
Ultimately, the impulse response functions will provide an indication of the relative time patterns of
the intermediaries’ debt financing behavior in the face of this policy uncertainty shock as well as
provide an indication of relative magnitude effects of the responses. Additionally, variance
decompositions will be utilized to examine the extent to which the variability of these policy
uncertainty shocks can explain the forecast prediction variance of the respective balance sheet
component.58

In order to assess statistical significance for the IRFs, in terms of 95% confidence bands, and VDCs, using two standard
deviations, the model was bootstrapped with 10,000 replications.
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4.4.1. Do Traditional Financial Intermediaries have a Smaller (Magnitude) Reaction than
Market-Based Firms to Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks?
The IRF results reported in Figure 4.2 can be used to test the validity of this claim, and reports the
reactions of each financial intermediaries’ debt-financing response to a shock in economic
uncertainty. In order to test the above hypothesis, the graphs can be examined for both statistical
significance as well as the magnitude or size of the IRF responses. If the IRF response is statistically
different from zero, then zero will not be contained within the 95% confidence bands. The top
panel reports the IRFs for the traditional financial intermediaries. These IRFs show that both the
small and large commercial banks reduce their non-core liabilities in response to a positive shock in
economic policy uncertainty. This negative response is determined by the upper bound confidence
band of the IRF response, which falls below zero at some point following the shock. The negative
response is consistent with expectations, as these firms reduce their borrowing behavior in the face
of a shock to economic policy uncertainty.
The total liabilities of the market-based intermediaries, on the other hand, display evidence
of a mixed reaction to the shock in economic uncertainty. The upper bound confidence band for the
security broker dealers falls below zero in the fifth quarter after the shock, while the ABS issuers
exhibit the opposite behavior, in the form of a positive response, throughout multiple periods in the
twenty-four month horizon. Thus, the negative response on behalf of the broker dealers follows
from intuition, in times of policy uncertainty, these firms practice risk averse behavior by reducing
their non-core liabilities.

The ABS issuers, on the other hand, actually display a positive and

significant response to policy uncertainty. From the mid-eighties through the financial crisis, ABS
issuers were experiencing rapid growth, and given that they are capitalized primarily through marketbased sources of financing such as short-term commercial paper, which is frequently rolled on a
continual basis, their positive response to economic uncertainties over this period is likely driven by
this behavior.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Response Function Results:
Variable Response to a Shock in Economic Uncertainty for VEC Model
1985Q2-2011Q4 Sample Period
Traditional Financial Intermediaries

Market-Based Financial Intermediaries

Overlay of the Four IRFs Above with Small Commercial Bank Confidence Bands
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While the IRFs indicate the timing, direction, and magnitude of the responses of these
liability components to economic policy uncertainty shocks, the true economic meaning that
uncertainty plays on each of the intermediaries’ balance sheets can be seen through the VDCs.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the VDC analysis, which indicate how much of the forecast
prediction variance in each of the balance sheet variables can be explained by shocks to economic
uncertainty and other model variables. Each panel of the tables reports the VDC point estimates for
each respective forecast time period along with the standard deviation of these values. If the
difference between the VDC and two standard deviations is less then zero, this suggests that the
result is not statistically different from zero. Thus, in order for economic policy uncertainty to play a
meaningful role in explaining the forecast prediction variance of each respective balance sheet
liabilities variable, the point estimates must exceed two standard deviations.
First, examining the VDCs for the small commercial banks, it is clear that economic policy
uncertainty shocks do indeed play an important role in their decision to utilize debt to finance their
investment activity. In fact, economic policy uncertainty holds the most relevance for impacting the
debt-financing behavior of the small commercial banks, with a statistically significant 10.82% of the
prediction variation in their non-core liabilities being explained by variations in economic policy
uncertainty four quarters after a shock. Economic policy uncertainty shocks have a statistically
insignificant impact on the non-core liabilities of the large commercial banks throughout the
forecasting period, as it appears its own shocks and inflation most influences their behavior.
When examining the remaining VDCs for the last two intermediaries, it is clear that
economic policy uncertainty has explanatory power for both market-based intermediaries.

For

example, accounting for statistical significance, after twelve-quarter forecasting periods, the variations
in economic uncertainty can explain 10.74% of the variation in the total liability behavior of the
security broker dealers. For the security broker dealers, aside from its own shocks, economic policy
uncertainty has the largest impact of any other variable based on the VDCs. Additionally, the ABS
issuers are also impacted by economic policy uncertainty by a statistically significant amount, with
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10.66% of their prediction variation being explained by uncertainty eight-quarters following a shock.
In fact, excluding its own shock and taking statistical significance into account, economic uncertainty
also has the largest impact on the ABS issuers.
Based on the IRF and VDC results, do traditional financial intermediaries display a smaller
(magnitude) response to economic policy uncertainty than traditional financial intermediaries? In
order to determine, which intermediary group displays the largest response, the final panel of Figure
4.2 plots each of the financial intermediary IRFs together with the confidence bands for the small
commercial banks. If the IRF responses for either of market-based intermediaries fall outside of the
small commercial bank confidence bands, and in particular, exceed the lower bound in this case, this
suggests a statistically different and larger response to the economic policy uncertainty shock. Since
the goal is to compare the traditional financial intermediaries to the market-based financial
intermediaries, and the VDC results for large commercial banks display a statistically insignificant
impact, the confidence bands for the small commercial banks are used for comparison. In this case,
however, the IRF analysis suggests that the response of small commercial banks’ non-core liabilities
is the largest. As indicated three quarters after the shock, the security broker dealers’ total liabilities’
response is smaller in magnitude relative to the upper confidence band. Additionally, if the positive
response of the ABS issuers is compared to the absolute value of the negative response of the small
commercial banks’ non-core liabilities, the magnitude of the latter group is still larger and statistically
different.
If we combine the results of the IRFs and VDCs, the evidence suggests that traditional firms
do not have a smaller debt-financing response to an economic policy uncertainty shock relative to
the market-based intermediaries. Given the riskier behavior and more volatile balance sheet behavior
typically associated with market-based firms, this result is quite interesting. There are several factors
that can explain these results.
First, the larger response of the smaller commercial banks to this type of shock may be
driven by the information that the economic policy uncertainty index is capturing and the availability

	
  

91

	
  
	
  
	
  
of resources at these institutions. Large commercial banks and security broker dealers, with regard to
their financing behavior, tend to access shorter-term investment vehicles and do so with greater
frequency than smaller financial intermediaries. As such, the larger institutions require more analysts
and greater resources to ascertain the current state of the market using all available information and
data. As a result a smaller financial institution may rely more heavily on current news and media
sources as a factor driving their balance sheet decisions than a larger financial intermediary. Given
that the economic policy index utilizes news-based sources as a significant portion for construction,
this can explain the larger response by the small commercial banks. Another possibility, is that small
commercial banks are simply more risk averse. Given that larger intermediaries have teams of risk
managers and have, arguably, a greater ability to hedge their bets, they are less conservative in their
response to uncertainty, while the smaller commercial banks respond to economic policy uncertainty
in a more conservative fashion. Lastly, the quarterly frequency of this analysis may be too low to
capture all the effects associated with the security broker dealers, ABS issuers, and even the large
commercial banks, given their use of certain short-term maturity vehicles.
In general, these results suggest that the traditional financial intermediaries do not exhibit
smaller debt-financing reactions to shocks in economic policy uncertainty. Given the large response
of the small commercial banks to this shock, this first hypothesis is not confirmed.

4.4.2. Do Traditional Financial Intermediaries have a Slower Response than Market-Based
Intermediaries to Economic Policy Uncertainty Shocks?
To examine the second hypothesis pertaining to the timing of the debt-financing responses, we can
again focus on the IRFs in Figure 4.2. The IRFs provide a visual of how long it takes the
intermediaries to react to a shock in economic uncertainty, which indicated by the statistical
significance throughout the time horizon. These results indicate support for the slower response
behavior of the traditional firms relative to the market-based firms to shocks in economic
uncertainty.

	
  

In terms of the traditional intermediaries, the non-core liabilities of the small

92

	
  
	
  
	
  
commercial banks again have a statistically significant negative response that begins three quarters
after a policy uncertainty shock, as the upper bound confidence band falls below zero at this point.
The non-core liabilities of the large commercial banks have a negative response that begins
immediately following the initial policy uncertainty shock; however, as indicated by the VDC analysis,
the non-core liability behavior of these firms is exogenous to economic policy uncertainty. Thus, the
three-quarter response on behalf of the small commercial banks represents the fastest speed at which
the traditional financial intermediaries respond to an economic policy uncertainty shock.
The security brokers also have a relatively quick, five-quarter, total liability response to this
type of shock, however it is still slower than that of the small commercial banks. The ABS issuers,
on the other hand, have an immediate response to this shock, in a fashion similar to the large
commercial banks, however, as the VDCs indicate, this shock holds economic meaning for these
market-based financial intermediaries.
By combining these results across the two groups of intermediaries, the validity of the
second hypothesis is confirmed, where the market-based firms alter their debt-financing behavior
faster than the traditional intermediaries. Given that traditional firms can also rely on their deposits
as a stable source of funding, in addition to their debt-financing, while the market-based firms must
rely solely on the latter, the market-based financial intermediaries are more receptive and more
vulnerable to shocks in uncertainty.

4.5. Concluding Remarks
In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been a renewed interest in truly understanding the role of
financial intermediaries and their behavior in our economy. The recent literature has made a point to
distinguish between traditional, depository-based financial intermediaries and market-based financial
intermediaries, such as security broker dealers and ABS issuers. There are two features that are
common to both types of institutions, both manage their balance sheets with “sticky” equity and they
both exhibit a pro-cyclical asset to leverage growth relationship. In comparison to firms in other
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sectors, financial intermediaries tend to actively manage their balance sheets, however they do so by
relying on the liability or debt-financing component of the balance sheet and target constant growth
rate changes in the equity component. In other words, equity is “sticky” for these firms and
ultimately the size of the balance sheet is dictated by changes in their debt-financing. Additionally,
both types of these intermediaries exhibit leverage behavior that fluctuates with financial cycles, when
assets rise so does leverage and vice versa. However the market-based firms display greater risk with
regard to the asset-leverage growth relationship, as they demonstrate greater leverage volatility or
fluctuation relative to the traditional firms.
Given the risky behavior of the market-based firms relative to the traditional financial
intermediaries combined with the “sticky” equity, the purpose of this paper is to examine how the
debt-financing behavior of the traditional and market-based financial intermediaries differs in the
face of economic policy uncertainty. By using the economic policy uncertainty index constructed by
Baker et. al (2012) and a VEC methodological approach, I examine two hypotheses. The first
hypothesis states the traditional financial intermediaries will have a smaller magnitude response of
their debt-financing behavior than their market-based counterparts to a shock in economic
uncertainty. The second hypothesis argues that the response of the traditional firms will also be
slower than the response of the market-based intermediaries. These claims are examined using IRF
and VDC analysis.
The overall findings of this analysis suggest mixed results pertaining to the validity of the
above hypotheses. With regard to the first hypothesis, traditional financial intermediaries, in the
form of small commercial banks, actually exhibit a larger debt-financing response to economic policy
uncertainty than either market-based firm. Given the reliance of the policy uncertainty index on a
news and media-based uncertainty coverage, this result may be driven by the lacking analytical
resources of these small commercial bank institutions and their reliance on the news and media as an
important factor in their decision making process. The second hypothesis is validated in this analysis,
where market-based financial intermediaries respond to an economic policy uncertainty shock faster
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than their traditional financial intermediary counterparts. Specifically, total liabilities of ABS issuers
respond immediately to a shock in policy uncertainty, while it takes the non-core liabilities of small
commercial banks three quarters to respond, and the total liabilities of the security broker dealers five
quarters to respond.
On the whole, this analysis extends the literature regarding the behavioral differences
between the traditional and market-based financial intermediaries. While previous literature has
highlighted their varying risk behavior, I examine how these firms actually react to policy uncertainty.
While the main causes of the financial crisis are now well known, including deregulation,
securitization, and the subprime mortgage crisis, understanding the underlying behaviors of the key
players of the crisis and how they respond to policy uncertainty is equally as important, which is
precisely the purpose of this analysis.
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Table 4.1: VEC Model
Preliminary Data Analysis and Diagnostics
Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests
Sample Period: 1985:2-2011:4
Levels
Gross Domestic Product (log)
-0.68
Consumer Price Index (log)
-1.67
Federal Funds Rate
-3.49 **
Large Commerical Banks Non-core Liabilities (log)
-0.22
Security Broker Dealers Total Liabilities (log)
-0.85
Asset Backed Securities Issuers Total Liabilities (log)
-0.72
Small Commercial Banks Non-core Liabilities (log)
-0.68

Differences
-4.23 ***
-6.84 ***
-4.24 ***
-3.54 **
-6.10 ***
-3.56 **
-5.25 ***

Critical Values: 10%(*) -3.135, 5%(**) -3.424, 1%(***) -3.987

Economic Policy Uncertainty Analysis
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Levels
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index: 1985Q2-2011Q4
-2.13
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index: 1985Q2-2007Q4
-3.88 **

Differences
-10.27 ***
-9.62 ***

Perron Unit Root Test in the Presence of One Structural Break
Break Point
2008Q1
T-statistic
-5.16 ***
Johansen Cointegration Trace Test
Estimation Sample: 1985:2 - 2011:4
Rank

0
1
2
3
4
5

Small
Sample
Correction Trace-95%
Trace Test
Statistic

128.08
67.82
42.44
22.50
8.73
1.76

117.45
88.55
63.66
42.77
25.73
12.45

P-Value
0.008***
0.594
0.759
0.891
0.961
0.969

Lag-Length Selection Criteria
Lag
BIC
AIC
0
-1400.90
-1419.94
1
-1520.60
-1675.85
2
-1369.86
-1625.38
3
-1170.30
-1474.94
4
-1048.67
-1326.20
5
-929.39
-1058.78
6
-868.12
-640.03
7
-823.84
173.09
8
-895.97
1866.17

Critical Values: 10%(*) , 5%(**), 1%(***)

Ljung-Box Test Analysis of Residuals: P-Value Significance
One-Lag Model Two-Lag Model
VAR Equation: Dependent Variable
Q(4)
Q(6)
Q(4)
Q(6)
Gross Domestic Product (log)
0.080
0.100
0.689
0.603
Consumer Price Index (log)
0.407
0.593
0.511
0.722
Federal Funds Rate
0.000
0.000
0.831
0.852
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
0.322
0.428
0.080
0.172
Large Commerical Banks Nonc-ore Liabilities (log)
0.413
0.633
0.342
0.529
Security Broker Dealers Total Liabilities (log)
0.462
0.708
0.901
0.769
Asset Backed Securities Issuers Total Liabilities (log)
0.005
0.004
0.001
0.000
Small Commercial Banks Non-core Liabilities (log)
0.536
0.574
0.676
0.556

	
  

Three-Lag Model
Q(4)
Q(6)
0.809
0.930
0.888
0.946
0.952
0.971
0.494
0.737
0.951
0.988
0.851
0.939
0.373
0.128
0.946
0.681
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St. De v . VDC
(2.23)
2.44
(2.46)
2.32
(2.32)
9.88
(2.31)
10.82
(2.47)
11.58
(2.50)
11.70
(2.59)
11.75
(2.64)
11.84
(2.66)
11.96

St. De v .
(3.46)
(3.36)
(5.04)
(4.93) *
(4.68) *
(4.67) *
(4.68) *
(4.70) *
(4.73) *

VDC
2.81
6.88
5.83
5.75
5.73
5.74
5.72
5.69
5.68

St. De v .
(3.90)
(4.68)
(4.05)
(4.01)
(3.88)
(3.83)
(3.81)
(3.79)
(3.78)

Large Commercial
Federal Funds Economic Policy
Banks' Non-Core
Rate
Uncertainty
Liabilities

St. De v . VDC
(2.52)
0.84
(2.74)
0.88
(2.82)
0.90
(2.79)
1.11
(3.14)
2.02
(3.15)
2.05
(3.14)
2.25
(3.14)
2.39
(3.14)
2.44

CPI

Federal Funds
Rate
St. De v .
(1.87)
(3.03)
(2.88)
(2.99)
(3.14)
(3.30)
(3.37)
(3.40)
(3.42)

VDC
0.01
1.28
1.32
1.52
1.58
1.86
2.03
2.05
2.05

VDC
14.77
12.14
10.58
10.12
11.51
11.50
11.48
11.47
11.46

St. De v .
(9.22)
(7.69)
(6.66)
(6.31)
(6.12)
(5.97)
(5.68) *
(5.50) *
(5.50) *

St. De v .
(1.95)
(5.14)
(5.60)
(5.38)
(5.09)
(5.03)
(5.05)
(5.08)
(5.11)

St. De v .
(2.52)
(3.00)
(3.39)
(3.24)
(3.19)
(3.21)
(3.22)
(3.22)
(3.23)

Security Broker
Dealers' Total
Liabilities
VDC
1.98
2.30
4.07
3.96
4.32
4.65
4.87
4.98
5.02

Large Commercial Security Broker
Economic Policy
Banks' Non-Core
Dealers' Total
Uncertainty
Liabilities
Liabilities
VDC
St. De v . VDC St. De v .
83.52 (11.03) *
0.00 (0.00)
75.35 (9.93) *
1.04 (1.70)
71.35 (9.12) *
1.48 (2.12)
69.75 (8.79) *
1.54 (2.24)
66.68 (8.56) *
2.24 (2.61)
65.93 (8.50) *
2.53 (2.69)
65.65 (8.53) *
2.57 (2.70)
65.52 (8.57) *
2.59 (2.72)
65.47 (8.59) *
2.60 (2.74)
VDC
0.42
6.56
8.60
8.58
8.41
8.30
8.30
8.36
8.41

St. De v .
(2.33)
(2.72)
(2.76)
(2.73)
(2.62)
(2.60)
(2.59)
(2.58)
(2.58)

VDC
89.34
83.68
71.10
68.04
64.08
63.32
62.82
62.45
62.23

St. De v .
(7.04) *
(7.25) *
(7.22) *
(7.09) *
(7.14) *
(7.16) *
(7.21) *
(7.26) *
(7.30) *

Small Commercial
ABS Issuers'
Banks' Non-Core
Total Liabilities
Liabilities
VDC
1.62
2.27
2.98
2.84
2.79
2.83
2.81
2.81
2.82

VDC
0.00
2.46
2.70
2.61
2.96
3.05
3.05
3.07
3.07

St. De v .
(0.00)
(2.74)
(2.68)
(2.68)
(2.98)
(2.98)
(2.98)
(2.98)
(2.98)

Small Commercial
ABS Issuers'
Banks' Non-Core
Total Liabilities
Liabilities
VDC St. De v .
0.00 (0.00)
0.07 (1.44)
0.06 (1.63)
0.17 (1.74)
0.49 (1.80)
0.50 (1.79)
0.50 (1.78)
0.50 (1.78)
0.50 (1.78)

Panel B: Forecast Prediction Variance of Large Commercial Bank Non-Core Liabilities

VDC
0.68
0.79
1.38
1.34
3.45
3.73
3.74
3.72
3.71

CPI

Panel A: Forecast Prediction Variance of Small Commercial Bank Non-Core Liabilities

Table 4.2: VEC Model Variance Decomposition Results for Traditional Financial Intermediaries: 1985Q2-2011Q4 Sample Period

St. De v .
(1.97)
(2.46)
(3.67)
(4.07)
(3.79)
(3.75)
(3.75)
(3.75)
(3.75)

GDP
Ho rizo n VDC
1
0.29
2
0.90
3
3.86
4
6.13
8
6.03
12
5.97
16
6.03
20
6.11
24
6.14

St. De v .
(3.64)
(3.28)
(4.15)
(4.78)
(4.74)
(4.73)
(4.72)
(4.71)
(4.71)

GDP
Ho rizo n VDC
1
1.29
2
1.10
3
3.91
4
5.71
8
6.13
12
6.32
16
6.42
20
6.43
24
6.43

Note: These tables present the variance decomposition results for the non-core liabilities of the traditional financial intermediaries. They are derived
from estimating a VEC model with the following variables and respective ordering: real GDP, Inflation, the Federal Funds rate, the Economic Policy
Uncertainty Index, the non-core liabilities of large commercial banks, the total liabilities of security broker dealers, the total liabilities of ABS issuers,
and the non-core liabilities of small commercial banks. Each panel reports the VDC point estimates along with their one standard deviation in
parentheses. The point estimate is considered statistically significant if it exceeds two standard deviations, as indicated by an asterisk (*).
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St. De v . VDC
(1.90)
7.14
(2.26)
7.90
(2.28)
7.29
(2.49)
7.92
(2.56)
9.91
(2.64)
10.74
(2.72)
11.16
(2.76)
11.45
(2.79)
11.64

St. De v .
(6.51)
(5.95)
(5.49)
(5.15)
(5.06)
(5.15) *
(5.25) *
(5.36) *
(5.45) *

VDC
1.98
2.30
2.84
2.93
2.83
2.90
2.88
2.87
2.87

St. De v .
(3.00)
(3.14)
(3.41)
(3.24)
(3.15)
(3.10)
(3.08)
(3.08)
(3.08)

Large Commercial
Federal Funds Economic Policy
Banks' Non-Core
Rate
Uncertainty
Liabilities

St. De v . VDC
(4.99)
0.04
(4.50)
0.07
(4.35)
0.08
(4.07)
0.48
(3.88)
0.72
(3.82)
1.18
(3.80)
1.41
(3.79)
1.51
(3.80)
1.54

St. De v .
(1.82)
(4.23)
(3.94)
(4.29)
(5.24) *
(6.13) *
(6.70) *
(7.03) *
(7.24) *

VDC
0.01
0.19
0.65
0.59
0.80
0.99
1.07
1.11
1.12

St. De v .
(1.30)
(1.89)
(2.27)
(2.34)
(2.63)
(2.76)
(2.84)
(2.88)
(2.90)

St. De v .
(8.86) *
(8.38) *
(7.99) *
(7.59) *
(7.40) *
(7.34) *
(7.34) *
(7.38) *
(7.42) *

Security Broker
Dealers' Total
Liabilities
VDC
87.03
80.62
78.39
73.71
70.74
69.33
68.68
68.30
68.09

VDC
0.52
3.16
3.26
2.99
3.22
3.75
4.32
4.64
4.83

St. De v .
(2.07)
(3.32)
(3.29)
(3.03)
(3.07)
(3.28)
(3.52)
(3.68)
(3.80)

Security Broker
Dealers' Total
Liabilities

Panel B: Forecast Prediction Variance of ABS Issuers’ Total Liabilities

St. De v . VDC
(5.18)
0.13
(4.68)
4.96
(4.53)
4.73
(4.55)
6.74
(4.86)
10.66
(5.32)
12.94
(5.44)
14.39
(5.49)
15.23
(5.52)
15.67

Large Commercial
Federal Funds Economic Policy
Banks' Non-Core
Rate
Uncertainty
Liabilities

St. De v . VDC
(2.37)
6.83
(2.88)
6.17
(4.23)
6.49
(4.54)
6.77
(4.60)
7.78
(4.75)
8.75
(4.77)
8.80
(4.78)
8.75
(4.79)
8.72

CPI
VDC
0.51
0.64
2.75
3.11
3.39
3.49
3.37
3.31
3.28

VDC
2.47
2.34
3.61
3.53
3.47
3.44
3.40
3.37
3.36

CPI

VDC
90.44
83.01
78.75
75.03
66.84
62.42
60.29
59.23
58.67

St. De v .
(0.00)
(2.54)
(2.91)
(2.79)
(2.88)
(2.89)
(2.89)
(2.89)
(2.90)

St. De v .
(6.52) *
(7.34) *
(7.72) *
(7.73) *
(8.45) *
(9.02) *
(9.42) *
(9.69) *
(9.90) *

VDC
0.00
0.70
1.04
4.11
4.16
4.08
4.03
4.00
3.98

VDC
0.00
0.04
0.23
0.21
0.58
0.59
0.59
0.58
0.58

St. De v .
(0.00)
(2.35)
(2.44)
(3.75)
(3.64)
(3.58)
(3.55)
(3.53)
(3.52)

St. De v .
(0.00)
(1.30)
(1.85)
(1.91)
(2.04)
(2.07)
(2.09)
(2.10)
(2.10)

Small Commercial
ABS Issuers'
Banks' Non-Core
Total Liabilities
Liabilities

VDC
0.00
1.81
2.16
2.19
2.77
2.90
2.91
2.92
2.93

Small Commercial
ABS Issuers'
Banks' Non-Core
Total Liabilities
Liabilities

Panel A: Forecast Prediction Variance of Security Broker Dealers’ Total Liabilities

Table 4.3: VEC Model Variance Decomposition Results for Market-Based Financial Intermediaries: 1985Q2-2011Q4 Sample Period

St. De v .
(3.14)
(4.49)
(4.37)
(4.03)
(3.79)
(3.72)
(3.71)
(3.71)
(3.71)

GDP
Ho rizo n VDC
1
1.35
2
4.27
3
4.60
4
5.13
8
5.40
12
5.43
16
5.54
20
5.59
24
5.60

St. De v .
(2.73)
(3.06)
(3.92)
(3.79)
(4.33)
(4.43)
(4.50)
(4.53)
(4.55)

GDP
Ho rizo n VDC
1
1.55
2
1.83
3
3.14
4
4.54
8
6.74
12
7.07
16
7.16
20
7.16
24
7.14

Note: These tables present the variance decomposition results for the total liabilities of the market-based financial intermediaries. They are derived
from estimating a VEC model with the following variables and respective ordering: real GDP, Inflation, the Federal Funds rate, the Economic
Policy Uncertainty Index, the non-core liabilities of large commercial banks, the total liabilities of security broker dealers, the total liabilities of ABS
issuers, and the non-core liabilities of small commercial banks. Each panel reports the VDC point estimates along with their one standard deviation
in parentheses. The point estimate is considered statistically significant if it exceeds two standard deviations, as indicated by an asterisk (*).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 opened the eyes of policymakers, academics,
and market participants to the true operations and impacts of the newly innovative and deregulated
U.S. financial system. The causes of this crisis are a function of widespread failure, ignorance, and
greed on the part of the government, the regulators, the ratings agencies, the financial market
participants, and even American homeowners. While the interactions and choices of these economic
agents collectively brought about this financial crisis, the underlying connection across these agents
that propagated and encouraged their behavior was their association with the financial intermediary
sector. Each one of the causes of this crisis can in some way be connected to the behavior of
financial intermediaries.
One of the biggest lessons that has been learned from this crisis is the role that financial
intermediaries play in our economy and how their risk behaviors can have significant impacts on the
stability of our nation.

To that end, the research of this dissertation is focused on better

understanding the varying behaviors of two different types of financial intermediaries: the traditional
or depository-based intermediaries and the market-based or non-depository financial intermediaries.
The key difference between this two groups concerns the derivation of their investment funding: the
traditional firms, which consist of the commercial banking sector, rely partially on deposits as a
source of funding, while the market-based firms rely exclusively on credit-based sources of
borrowing, such as commercial paper or repurchase agreements. While recent literature has sought
to put the pieces of the financial crisis together and better understand the impact that financial
intermediaries have on the economy, the purpose of this research is to isolate the two different types
of financial intermediaries and assess how their behaviors differ. Specifically, I analyze the variations
in the equity-based risk behavior, the stock market survival behavior, and the debt-financing
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responses to economic policy uncertainty shocks across these two financial intermediary groups.
Chapter 2 presents the first essay of this dissertation, which focuses on quantifying the
equity-based risk differences across these financial intermediaries and the factors that are most
responsible for driving these differences. Initially, I seek to determine which of the intermediary
groups, the traditional or market-based, demonstrate riskier behavior. I combine the Campbell et al.
(2001) CLMX model approach with data from the Center for Research and Security Prices to derive
an equity-based measure of industry-level and average firm-level volatility. While the industry-level
risk measures appear statistically similar across the traditional and market-based financial
intermediaries, there is a notable distinction across the average firm-level risk measures, where the
market-based financial intermediaries display significantly larger volatility for the ten-year period
beginning around 1994. These results are consistent to both including and excluding the financial
crisis. The first key conclusion indicates that market-based financial intermediaries are indeed riskier
than the traditional financial intermediaries.
However, the second part of this first essay focuses on understanding why this is case. What
changes in the financial intermediary sector have occurred that can help explain the evolution of
these risk differences? Historically, the past thirty years have shown the greatest amount of financial
market instability relative to any other time period. The three primary causes most commonly
associated with this instability include deregulation, increasing financial intermediary competition,
and financial innovation. Given these three causes are responsible for the instability and changes in
the financial market sector, I assess which of these factors best explain the changing equity-based risk
behavior across these intermediary groups using the historical decomposition approach of the VAR
framework. While examining various sample periods with historical decomposition analysis, I find
that the regulatory changes over the past two decades were the biggest factor responsible for
explaining the changing nature of risk across these financial intermediaries. Additionally, the changes
in financial intermediary competition also had a larger impact than securitization in explaining the
risk behaviors.
The second essay of this dissertation or Chapter 3, examines the stock market survival
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behavior of the traditional and market-based financial intermediaries. Given the greater risk behavior
associated with the market-based financial intermediaries, I examine the hypothesis that these
intermediaries will have a lower stock market survival rate relative to the traditional firms. While
stock market survival refers to the delisting behavior of these firms, a firm can delist for two primary
reasons, the firm can fail or the firm can be acquired through M&A activity. Thus, I also evaluate
this survival behavior with respect to cause-specific delisting behavior.
Using a sample of nearly nine-hundred financial intermediaries and several survival analysis
techniques, I construct survival curves and cumulative incidence functions for both of the
intermediary groups. The results suggest that the market-based firms have a much lower stock
market survival rate with respect to general delisting as compared to the traditional institutions.
When this delisting behavior is decomposed into the specific causes or reasons for delisting, namely
firm failure and M&A activity, I find that the market-based firms are more likely to delist under both
scenarios. Since a key difference across these intermediaries is the greater relative risk behavior of
the market-based firms, I also test the significance of this idiosyncratic risk in explaining the stock
market survival behavior. Using the Cox Proportional Hazards model, I find that the greater risk
associated with the market-based firms can explain some of the aforementioned stock market
survival patterns.
The last essay, or Chapter 4 of this research, analyzes the balance sheet behavior variations
across these intermediaries. I examine how the debt-financing behavior of these intermediaries
responds to shocks in economic policy uncertainty. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that the
response of the non-core liabilities of the traditional financial intermediaries will be smaller and
slower to this shock than the response of the total liabilities of the market-based financial
intermediaries. Previous literature by Adrian and Shin (2011) has indicated that the equity component
of the balance sheet for financial intermediaries tends to be “sticky” suggesting that the driving force
of fluctuation is coming from the liabilities component of the balance sheet. Given the importance
of the debt-financing component of the balance sheet and the dependence of market-based financial
intermediaries on market-derived credit (as compared to the traditional firms that rely on both
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deposits as well as credit), a stage has been set for the key hypothesis. The market-based financial
intermediaries’ reliance on debt-financing should translate into larger and faster reactions of their
liabilities’ to a shock in economic policy uncertainty as compared to the traditional firms.
In order to assess this hypothesis, I utilize the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data for
small and large commercial banks, security broker dealers, and ABS issuers in a VEC model
framework along with a measure of economic policy uncertainty. Economic policy uncertainty is
captured using a recently constructed index by Baker et. al (2012), which captures news-based policy
uncertainty, tax-based policy uncertainty, and uncertainty related to the disparity of forecaster
disagreements. By using the index approach, the general behavior of the financial intermediaries’
responses can be captured across a broad measure of policy uncertainty rather than one specific kind.
The key hypothesis regarding the timing and magnitude of the response is analyzed using IRF and
VDC analysis.
The results, both including and excluding the financial crisis period, indicate that the
response of the total liabilities of market-based intermediaries is faster, but not larger, than the
response of the non-core liabilities of the traditional firms. In fact, a shock to economic policy
uncertainty results in a reduction in the total liabilities of security broker dealers and a reduction in
the total non-core liabilities for the small commercial banks, while it results in an increase in the
borrowing behavior for ABS issuers. The total liabilities of the ABS issuers have the fastest response
to a policy uncertainty shock, by responding immediately, followed by the non-core liabilities of the
small commercial banks three quarters later, and the liabilities of the security broker dealers five
quarters after the shock. Thus, the market-based financial intermediaries have the fastest response to
this policy uncertainty.

Additionally, both the IRF and VDC analysis demonstrate that the

magnitude of the response for the small commercial banks is larger than that of both of the marketbased financial intermediaries. Given the reliance of the policy uncertainty index on news and mediabased uncertainty coverage, this result may be driven by the lacking analytical resources of these small
commercial bank institutions and their reliance on the news and media as an important factor in their
decision making process.
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In short, the key conclusions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: (1) driven
by deregulation, market-based financial intermediaries demonstrate greater equity-based risk behavior
than traditional financial intermediaries, (2) market-based firms are more susceptible to firm failure
and M&A activity and are less likely to survive after listing on the stock exchange than traditional
intermediaries, and (3) the debt-financing response of market-based financial intermediaries to
shocks in economic policy uncertainty is faster, but not necessarily larger, than their traditional
counterparts.
Having established these relationships, it is worthwhile to discuss their relevance as it
pertains to the current state of the financial intermediary sector and their subsequent policy
implications. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), one of the major causes
of the recent financial crisis was the excessive risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries. My
research specifically aims to provide more clarity with respect to understanding this risk behavior.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this research is the greater risk associated with the
market-based or non-bank financial intermediaries relative to traditional firms, whether this risk
refers to equity-based risk, risk of stock market delisting, or faster balance sheet reactions to
economic policy uncertainty.
Unfortunately, despite the post-financial crisis efforts of the government and regulators,
even four years after the crisis, it appears many of these market-based firms have failed to learn the
lessons of the past. A quick glance at the newspaper headlines confirms this notion, such as the New
York Times article, “JP Morgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion,” (Silver-Greenberg 2012) and
the Bloomberg Business Week article, “MF Global Trustee Says $1.2B or More Missing” (Gordon
2011).

Each of these situations, JP Morgan experiencing significant trading losses and the

bankruptcy of MF Global, all resulted from risky bets that turned against the firms. It seems the
greater risk associated with these firms is still a clear and present danger for our economy.
The general policy prescription out of the financial crisis is the need for greater regulation
and control over financial intermediaries to minimize these risks. While the research conducted in
this dissertation completely supports this policy prescription, it takes this notion a step further by
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suggesting that these regulatory changes need to have a particular focus on the market-based and
non-bank financial intermediary sector; as firms of this type demonstrate greater average firm-level
risk, a greater risk of firm failure and M&A activity with respect to stock market delisting, and faster,
potentially rushed, balance sheet responses to economic policy uncertainty shocks.
A provision of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) established the creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, which is responsible for monitoring the potential systemic risk of the sector. This
Council also has among their many objectives the task of regulating non-bank financial companies
and strengthening capital standards. This research provides further ammunition for the need and
importance of regulating this specific type of financial intermediary. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank
Act (2010) also places restrictions on taxpayer funded bailouts for financial firms and enacts a
number of provisions to strengthen the transparency and monitoring of these financial firms in an
effort to eliminate any potential, catastrophic, failures. In the face of a similar situation reoccurring
in the future, in terms of bailouts or even liquidity assistance from the Federal Reserve, my research
regarding the delisting behavior of market-based firms and traditional firms also holds value. While
the analysis was conducted over publicly-traded firms due to data availability, the results can extend
to non-publicly-traded intermediaries as well. Specifically, if financial intermediaries in the future find
themselves in the position of needing assistance from the government or the Federal Reserve, greater
caution must be taken with respect to lending to market-based firms relative to traditional firms as
the former is less likely to survive.
Ultimately, while steps have been taken on the regulatory front to help correct for the
failings of our financial system, the current effectiveness of these actions is still unknown. This
research strengthens the need for stronger regulation and monitoring of the market-based
component of the financial intermediary sector, and as evidenced by recent newsworthy events, this
will be an ongoing challenge. However, the success of these regulations and their resolution will
prove very important to the stability of the financial markets and ultimately the U.S. economy.
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Appendix A
Supplement Graphs and Figures to Chapter 2
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Figure A.1: Industry-Level Volatility Across Traditional and Market-Based Financial
Intermediaries 1980-2008

**This graph compares the equity-based industry-level volatility of the market-based and traditional
financial intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX model

Figure A.2: The 12-month Backward Moving Average Industry-Level Volatility Across
Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediaries 1980-2008

**This graph compares the equity-based industry-level volatility of the market-based and
traditional financial intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX model
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Figure A.3: Average Firm-Level Volatility Across Traditional and Market-Based Financial
Intermediary Industries 1980-2008

**This graph compares the equity-based average firm-level volatility within each of the
market-based and traditional financial intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX
model

Figure A.4: The 12-month Backward Moving Average of the Average Firm-Level Volatility
Across Traditional and Market-Based Financial Intermediary Industries 1980-2008

**This graph compares the equity-based average firm-level volatility within each of the
market-based and traditional financial intermediary sectors, as derived from the CLMX
model
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Figure A.5: Securitization Measure: The Percentage of Home Mortgages Held by MarketBased Financial Intermediaries

*This data was interpolated from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds tables,
and presents the results of interpolating by the cubic spline and Denton
approaches.
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Figure A.6: Historical Decomposition Analysis for Competition, Financial Innovation, and
Regulation Effects for 12-Lag VAR Model Estimated from 1980:09-2007:12
HD Subsamples for Risk Divergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1993:05-1999:11

HD Subsample Period: 1995:11-1999:11
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Figure A.7: Historical Decomposition Analysis for Competition, Financial Innovation, and
Regulation Effects for 12-Lag VAR Model Estimated from 1980:09-2007:12
HD Subsamples for Risk Convergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1999:12-2007:12

HD Subsample Period: 2004:03-2007:12
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Figure A.8: Historical Decomposition Analysis for Competition, Financial Innovation, and
Regulation Effects for 4-Lag VAR Model Estimated from 1980:09-2010:12
HD Subsamples for Risk Divergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1993:05-1999:11

HD Subsample Period: 1995:11-1999:11

HD Subsamples for Risk Convergence Period
HD Subsample Period: 1999:12-2007:12

	
  

HD Subsample Period: 2004:03-2007:12
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Table A.1: Historical Decomposition Root-Mean-Square-Error Analysis for all Variables for
Divergence Period

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2010:12

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.831

0.211

0.948

0.392

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.760

0.210

0.785

0.359

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.656

0.209

0.904

0.384

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.831

0.191

0.948

0.390

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.935

0.324

0.950

0.385

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.848

0.235

1.006

0.440

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.785

0.193

0.930

0.343

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.773

0.213

0.948

0.395

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2010:12

	
  

HDC Sample Period: 1993:04 - 1999:11
12 Lag Model RMSE

HDC Sample Period: 1995:11 - 1999:11
12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.475

0.117

0.506

0.165

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.384

0.116

0.356

0.135

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.293

0.128

0.475

0.164

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.495

0.119

0.507

0.163

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.582

0.214

0.495

0.126

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.462

0.129

0.478

0.143

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.428

0.144

0.414

0.128

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.408

0.117

0.503

0.166
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Table A.2: Historical Decomposition Root Mean Square Analysis for all Variables for
Convergence Period
Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2010:12

12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.406

0.232

0.527

0.335

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.358

0.230

0.398

0.337

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.238

0.247

0.490

0.334

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.395

0.216

0.506

0.340

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.240

0.241

0.540

0.333

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.499

0.222

0.629

0.318

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.559

0.206

0.755

0.264

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.286

0.244

0.543

0.336

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2010:12

	
  

HDC Sample Period: 1999:12 - 2007:12

HDC Sample Period: 2004:03 - 2007:12
12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.186

0.122

0.293

0.139

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.202

0.120

0.279

0.140

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.095

0.134

0.288

0.137

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.211

0.114

0.296

0.139

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.128

0.157

0.297

0.145

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.219

0.117

0.318

0.144

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.055

0.123

0.510

0.169

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.241

0.114

0.291

0.144
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Table A.3: Preliminary Data Analysis for 1980:09-2007:12 Sample Period
Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests
Sample Period: 1980:09-2007:12
Levels
Differences
Industrial Production (log)
-2.65
-5.79 ***
Consumer Price Index (log)
-3.10
-8.75 ***
Federal Funds Rate
-3.63 ** -10.93 ***
Commerical Bank Deposits (log)
-1.53
-6.98 ***
Repurchase Agreements (log)
-3.13
-12.53 ***
Competition (log HHI ratio)
-0.15
-8.87 ***
Securitization (log)
-3.42 **
-5.21 ***
Risk Ratio (log)
-1.42
-6.47 ***

Johansen Cointegration Trace Test

Critical Values: 10%(*) -3.135, 5%(**) -3.424, 1%(***) -3.987

Significance: 5% (**), 1%(***)

Estimation Sample:
1980:09-2007:12
VAR Lag Selection: BIC/SBC
0
-2018.9
1
-12558.4
2
-12903.8
3
-12997.2
4
-13077.3 *
5
-12917.2
6
-12635.2
7
-12445.9
8
-12190.0
9
-11948.4
10
-11700.5
11
-11471.7
12
-11252.4

Rank

0
1
2
3
4
5

Trace
Test
Statistic

Small Sample
Correction
Trace Test

130.99*** 120.59**
68.36
59.56
40.00
34.26
23.94
14.16
14.49
8.41
6.25
4.21

Trace95%

117.45
88.55
63.66
42.77
25.73
12.45

Ljung-Box Test Analysis
VAR Equation: Dependent
Model Type
Variable
Industrial Production (log)
Consumer Price Index (log)
Federal Funds Rate
Commercial Bank Deposits (log)
Repurchase Agreements (log)
Competition (log HHI ratio)
Securitization (log)
Risk Ratio (log)

	
  

Estimation Sample: 1980:09 - 2007:12

4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag
4-Lag
12-Lag

P-Value Significance for
Q(3)
Q(6)
Q(9)
0.976
0.997
0.794
0.709
0.440
0.388
0.843
0.015
0.018
0.985
0.960
0.983
0.082
0.001
0.000
0.901
0.733
0.133
0.973
0.922
0.385
0.961
0.997
0.992
0.954
0.803
0.065
0.925
0.958
0.996
0.998
0.996
0.995
0.989
0.992
0.999
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.971
0.944
0.363
0.865
0.965
0.909
0.628
0.752
0.568
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Table A.4: Historical Decomposition Root-Mean-Square-Error Analysis for Competition,
Financial Innovation, and Regulation Effects with Ex-Crisis VECM Estimation Period
Estimation Sample Period:

1980:09 - 2007:12

Div e rg e n c e Pe rio d An aly sis
HDC Sample Period: 1993:05 - 1999:11

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

4 Lag Model RMSE
No RegulationRegulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.769

0.259

1.007

0.739

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.769

0.264

1.029

0.695

0.683

0.279

0.972

0.754

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k
HDC Sample Period: 1995:11 -1999:11

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

4 Lag Model RMSE
No RegulationRegulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.352

0.096

0.603

0.332

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.367

0.135

0.557

0.295

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.206

0.096

0.583

0.340

Co n v e rg e n c e Pe rio d An aly sis
HDC Sample Period: 1999:12 -2007:12

4 Lag Model RMSE
No RegulationRegulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.751

0.146

0.559

0.287

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.702

0.132

0.760

0.180

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.497

0.172

0.513

0.310

HDC Sample Period: 2004:03 -2007:12

	
  

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

12 Lag Model RMSE
No Regulation Regulation

4 Lag Model RMSE
No RegulationRegulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.264

0.183

0.293

0.276

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.236

0.161

0.128

0.239

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.385

0.209

0.370

0.289
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Table A.5: Historical Decomposition Root-Mean-Square-Error Analysis for all Variables for
Divergence Period with Ex-Crisis VECM Estimation Period

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2007:12

12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.769

0.259

1.007

0.739

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.784

0.249

0.922

0.749

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.633

0.244

0.948

0.722

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.777

0.259

0.992

0.748

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.843

0.272

1.027

0.728

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.743

0.259

1.043

0.765

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.769

0.264

1.029

0.695

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.683

0.279

0.972

0.754

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2007:12

	
  

HDC Sample Period: 1993:05 - 1999:11

HDC Sample Period: 1995:11 - 1999:11
12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.352

0.096

0.603

0.332

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.366

0.096

0.518

0.327

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.274

0.095

0.569

0.332

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.381

0.098

0.578

0.329

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.439

0.183

0.547

0.272

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.289

0.082

0.535

0.278

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.367

0.135

0.557

0.295

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.206

0.096

0.583

0.340
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Table A.6: Historical Decomposition Root-Mean-Square-Error Analysis for all Variables for
Convergence Period with Ex-Crisis VECM Estimation Period

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2007:12

12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.751

0.146

0.559

0.287

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.758

0.136

0.364

0.288

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.601

0.147

0.461

0.286

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.734

0.148

0.557

0.291

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.718

0.140

0.610

0.282

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.726

0.143

0.545

0.290

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.702

0.132

0.760

0.180

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.497

0.172

0.513

0.310

Estimation Sample Period:
1980:09 - 2007:12

	
  

HDC Sample Period: 1999:12 - 2007:12

HDC Sample Period: 2004:03 - 2007:12
12 Lag Model RMSE

4 Lag Model RMSE

No Regulation

Regulation

No Regulation

Regulation

B ase Pro je c tio n

0.264

0.183

0.293

0.276

B ase + In d u strial Pro d u c tio n Sh o c k

0.268

0.172

0.254

0.258

B ase + In flatio n Sh o c k

0.136

0.183

0.239

0.255

B ase + Fe d e ral Fu n d s Rate Sh o c k

0.241

0.185

0.198

0.269

B ase + B an k Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.223

0.172

0.312

0.298

B ase + Re p o Fin an c in g Sh o c k

0.261

0.179

0.307

0.278

B ase + Co m p e titio n Sh o c k

0.236

0.161

0.128

0.239

B ase + Se c u ritizatio n Sh o c k

0.385

0.209

0.370

0.289
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Appendix B
Supplement Graphs and Figures to Chapter 3
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Figure B.1: Survival Functions against Non-Cause Specific Stock Delisting Across Financial
Intermediaries (Full Data Sample)

Traditional Intermediaries
Market-Based Intermediaries

Figure B.2: Cumulative Incidence of Cause-Specific Delisting Across Financial Intermediaries
(Full Data Sample)

Traditional Intermediaries
Market-Based Intermediaries

Quarters of Active Stock Listing

	
  

Panel B: Merger Delisting
Cumulative Incidence of Merger Delisting

Cumulative Incidence of Failure Delisting

Panel A: Failure Delisting

Quarters of Active Stock Listing
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Table B.1: Weighted Schoenfeld Residual Test of the Proportional Hazards Assumption

Weighted Schoenfeld Residual Test Results
p-values
Traditional vs. Market-based Dummy
0.000
0.246Cox model regards
Note: According to Therneau andGrowth
Grambsch (2000), a standard assumption of the basic
proportional hazards across covariate
values.
In
other
words,
changes
in
covariate
values will result in a
Profitability
0.574
multiplicative effect on the baseline hazard or a parallel shift in the hazard specification. Schoenfeld residuals
are calculated as the difference
betweenGrowth
the covariate value for a subject that failed at 0.427
time t and the weighted
Leverage
(weighted by probability of failing at time t) average of all the covariate values of the firms in the risk set at time
Excess
Returnsa basic Cox model with only a dummy indicator
0.357 for intermediary
t. The analysis above began with
estimating
type, whereby the coefficient estimates
were
obtained
and
Schoenfeld
residuals
calculated.
Size
0.573The final residuals
are then weighted by the variance of the respective beta. If the proportional hazards assumption is valid for a
Risk residuals should be independent of0.486
specific covariate, then the Idiosyncratic
resulting Schoenfeld
time, thus running a

standard Pearson Correlation analysis between these residuals and the time variable should fail to reject the null
hypothesis of a zero correlation. Table B.1 presents the resulting p-values from this correlation analysis testing
the residuals for this respective covariate. The traditional vs. market-based dummy variable fails this test,
suggesting stratification or separate model estimation across these intermediaries.

Table B.2: Full Sample Competing Risks Model under Stratification
Full Sample: Stratification
Balance Sheet Variables
Growth
Profitability

Traditional & Market-based Intermediaries
Delisting: All
-0.763 ***

Delisting: Failure
0.032

Delisting: Merger
-1.564 ***

(0.004)

(0.932)

-0.005

-0.017 ***

(0.000)

0.014

(0.320)

(0.003)

(0.183)

Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk

0.536 ***

-0.813 ***

1.236 ***

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.186 ***

-0.739 ***

-0.037

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.241)

3.447 ***

7.773 ***

-2.778 *

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.060)

Number of Firms
861
861
861
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence
519
126
393
Notes:
1. Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net
income/total assets | Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return and valueweighted return of all stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP |
Relative Size = ln(market value/market value of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic
Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
2. 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
3. P-values are indicated in parenthesis.
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Table B.3: Time Series Analysis and Diagnostics of the Equal-weighted, Market-Based Financial
Intermediaries’ Idiosyncratic Risk Measure with Chow Tests
Panel A: Unit Root Test
Augemented Dickey-Fuller Test
Single Mean
Tau Statistic P-Value
Market-Based Intermediaries Idiosyncratic Risk
-3.34
0.0156
*The ADF test suggests rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root, thus
the idiosyncratic risk measure for the market-based intermediaries is
stationary.
Panel B: Bayesian Information Criterion for Lag Length Selection

Panel B: Bayesian Information Criterion for Lag Length Selection

BIC Minimum Information Criteria
Lags
MA 0
MA 1
MA 2
MA 3
MA 4
AR 0
-8.422
-8.653
-8.842
-8.952
-9.131
AR 1
-9.296
-9.254
-9.243
-9.210
-9.194
AR 2
-9.290
-9.261
-9.219
-9.182
-9.158
AR 3
-9.254
-9.222
-9.179
-9.139
-9.116
AR 4
-9.215
-9.187
-9.144
-9.101
-9.075
AR 5
-9.206
-9.173
-9.130
-9.091
-9.049
*According the BIC, the appropriate model fit for market-based intermediaries' idiosyncratic risk is an AR(1) model.

Panel C: White Noise Probabilities of the
Residuals Following AR(1) Fit

Panel D: Chow Tests for Structural Breaks

White Noise Probabilities

Quarter F-Value
3/1/1990
0.31
6/1/1990
0.40
9/1/1990
0.59
12/1/1990 0.79
3/1/1991
1.55
6/1/1991
2.67
9/1/1991
3.37
12/1/1991 4.02
3/1/1992
4.48
6/1/1992
6.11
9/1/1992
6.08

Lag

MA 5
-9.174
-9.167
-9.134
-9.091
-9.051
-9.019

P-Value
0.577
0.526
0.444
0.377
0.215
0.105
0.069 *
0.048 **
0.037 **
0.015 **
0.015 **

Quarter F-Value
12/1/1992 6.07
3/1/1993
5.80
6/1/1993
5.38
9/1/1993
4.52
12/1/1993 3.94
3/1/1994
3.28
6/1/1994
2.60
9/1/1994
1.98
12/1/1994 1.50
3/1/1995
1.10
6/1/1995
0.81

P-Value
0.015 **
0.018 **
0.022 **
0.036 **
0.050 **
0.073 *
0.110
0.162
0.224
0.297
0.370

*The Chow Tests suggest a structural break in the last
quarter of 1991 (at the 5% significance level).

*This graph indicates that the residuals
from the AR(1) process exhibit white
noise behavior suggesting a good model
fit.
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Table B.4: Post ’91 Sample Competing Risks Model
Traditional Intermediaries

Post '91 Sample
Balance Sheet Variables

Delisting: All

Growth

-4.296 ***

Delisting:
Failure
-2.524

(0.000)

(0.474)

(0.000)

0.009

-0.002

0.017

(0.752)

(0.964)

(0.533)

Profitability
Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk

2.
3.

Delisting:
Failure
-0.586

Delisting:
Merger
-1.138 **

(0.059)

(0.314)

(0.043)

-0.002

-0.010

0.014

(0.820)

(0.379)

(0.413)

Delisting: All
-0.825 *

1.961 ***

-0.834

2.634 ***

0.048

-1.490 ***

0.849 ***

(0.000)

(0.204)

(0.000)

(0.823)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.129 **

-0.980 ***

-0.016

-0.163 ***

-0.642 *** -0.048

(0.017)

(0.000)

(0.780)

(0.000)

(0.000)

4.097 ***

7.410 ***

-0.148

2.653 **

9.251 *** -5.707 **

(0.006)

(0.002)

(0.946)

(0.046)

(0.000)

Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

Market-Based Intermediaries

Delisting:
Merger
-4.816 ***

(0.327)
(0.038)

462

462

462

264

264

264

247

38

209

164

43

121

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net income/total assets |
Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return and value-weighted return of all stocks listed on
the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP | Relative Size = ln(market value/market value of
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.

Table B.5: Post ’91 Sample Competing Risks Model: Market Only Specification under
Stratification

Post '91 Sample: Stratification
Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence
Notes:
1.

2.
3.

	
  

Traditional & Market-based Intermediaries
Delisting: All
0.205 *
(.080)

-0.172 ***

Delisting: Failure Delisting: Merger
-2.108 ***
(.000)

-0.786 ***

(.000)

(.000)

3.623 ***

6.349 ***

(.000)

(.000)

1.184 ***
(.000)

-0.029
(.279)

-4.662 ***
(.001)

1447

1447

1447

915

205

710

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net
income/total assets | Leverage Growth = growth rate of (total assets/total equity) |
Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return and value-weighted return of
all stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP | Relative Size
= ln(market value/market value of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic Risk
= squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.
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Table B.6: Post ’91 Sample Competing Risks Model: Market Only Specification
Post '91 Sample

Traditional Intermediaries

Market Variables

Delisting: All

Delisting:
Failure

Delisting:
Merger

1.341 ***

-0.964 **

2.281 ***

Excess Return

(.000)

-0.182 ***

Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

(.040)

Market-Based Intermediaries
Delisting: All
-0.383 **

(.000)

-1.116 ***

(.000)

(.000)

5.804 ***

7.483 ***

(.000)

(.000)

Delisting:
Failure

Delisting:
Merger

-2.640 ***

0.934 ***

(.032)

-0.049

(.000)

-0.160 ***

(.215)

-2.095
(.316)

-0.644 ***

(.000)

(.000)

3.393 ***

5.381 ***

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

-0.019
(.617)

-7.292 ***
(.001)

947

947

947

490

490

490

574

102

472

341

103

238

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net income/total
assets | Leverage Growth = growth rate of (total assets/total equity)| Excess Return = difference
between firm quarterly return and value-weighted return of all stocks listed on the
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP | Relative Size = ln(market value/market value of
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993)
model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.

Table B.7: Full Sample Competing Risks Model with Stratification Including Leverage Growth
Full Sample: Stratification
Balance Sheet Variables
Growth
Profitability
Leverage Growth

Traditional & Market-based Intermediaries
Delisting: All
-0.874 ***

Delisting:
Failure
-0.126

Delisting:
Merger
-1.543 ***
(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.739)

-0.005

-0.017 ***

0.013

(0.375)

(0.003)

(0.191)

0.220 **

0.367 ***

-0.039

(0.044)

(0.009)

(0.891)

Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

	
  

0.550 ***

-0.783 ***

1.234 ***

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.185 ***

-0.741 ***

-0.038

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.239)

3.268 ***

7.359 ***

-2.758 *

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.063)

861

861

861

519

126

393

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net
income/total assets | Leverage Growth = growth rate of (total assets/total equity) |
Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return and value-weighted return
of all stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP | Relative
Size = ln(market value/market value of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) |
Idiosyncratic Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.
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Table B.8: Full Sample Competing Risks Model Including Leverage Growth
Full Sample: Separate
Balance Sheet Variables
Growth
Profitability
Leverage Growth

Traditional Intermediaries

Market-Based Intermediaries

-2.066 ***

Delisting:
Failure
0.210

Delisting:
Merger
-2.812 ***

(0.000)

(0.854)

(0.000)

0.025

0.007

0.034 *

(0.204)

(0.914)

(0.098)

(0.085)

Delisting: All

Delisting:
Failure
-0.306

Delisting:
Merger
-1.056 **

(0.106)

(0.489)

(0.032)

-0.010 *

-0.016 **

0.007

(0.010)

(0.564)

Delisting: All
-0.526

0.366

0.353

-0.435

0.163

0.340 **

0.034

(0.240)

(0.315)

(0.433)

(0.185)

(0.030)

(0.907)

Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

1.892 ***

-0.505

2.658 ***

0.130

-0.883 ***

0.963 ***

(0.000)

(0.371)

(0.000)

(0.435)

(0.002)

(0.000)

-0.157 ***

-0.946 ***

-0.058

-0.206 ***

-0.681 *** -0.039

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.229)

(0.000)

(0.000)

3.300 **

7.529 ***

-2.723

2.852 ***

6.999 *** -4.385 **

(0.025)

(0.000)

(0.235)

(0.007)

(0.000)

(0.368)
(0.041)

490

490

490

371

371

371

269

46

223

250

80

170

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = growth rate of total assets | Profitability = net income/total assets
| Leverage Growth = growth rate of (total assets/total equity) | Excess Return = difference between
firm quarterly return and value-weighted return of all stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as
obtained from CRSP | Relative Size = ln(market value/market value of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) |
Idiosyncratic Risk = squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.

Table B.9: Post ’91 Sample Competing Risks Model Including Leverage Growth
Post '91 Sample
Balance Sheet Variables
Growth
Profitability
Leverage Growth

Traditional Intermediaries

Market-Based Intermediaries

-4.571 ***

Delisting:
Failure
-2.905

Delisting:
Merger
-4.706 ***

(0.000)

(0.397)

(0.000)

0.007

0.024

0.020

(0.805)

(0.768)

(0.488)

(0.868)

Delisting: All

Delisting:
Failure
-0.594

Delisting:
Merger
-1.397 **

(0.059)

(0.316)

(0.030)

-0.001

-0.010

0.017

(0.378)

(0.353)

Delisting: All
-0.903 *

0.745 *

1.304 **

-0.270

0.111

0.033

0.349

(0.057)

(0.021)

(0.637)

(0.655)

(0.899)

(0.395)

Market Variables
Excess Return
Relative Size
Idiosyncratic Risk
Number of Firms
Number of Firms with Event
Occurrence

Notes:
1.

2.
3.

	
  

2.027 ***

-0.923

2.611 ***

0.058

-1.481 ***

0.865 ***

(0.000)

(0.172)

(0.000)

(0.787)

(0.001)

(0.000)

-0.120 **

-0.900 ***

-0.017

-0.163 ***

-0.643 *** -0.047

(0.026)

(0.000)

(0.757)

(0.000)

(0.000)

3.120 *

5.181 *

0.047

2.593 *

9.223 *** -5.837 **

(0.053)

(0.056)

(0.983)

(0.053)

(0.000)

(0.340)
(0.034)

462

462

462

264

264

264

247

38

209

164

43

121

Variable Definitions: Firm Growth = ln(total assets) | Profitability = net income/total assets |
Leverage Growth = total assets/total equity| Excess Return = difference between firm quarterly return
and value-weighted return of all stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as obtained from CRSP |
Relatives Size = ln(market value/market value of NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index) | Idiosyncratic Risk =
squared residual from Fama and French (1993) model
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels denoted ***, **, * respectively.
P-values are indicated in parenthesis.
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